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In the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis, the contract rights of
numerous hedge funds and venture capital funds were breached.  These
contracts were complex and sophisticated and had been negotiated at great
time and expense.  Yet despite all of the assumptions of neo-classical con-
tracts theory, nothing happened.  Practically none of these injured parties
sued to enforce their rights.
Professor Illig uses this dearth of litigation to conduct a form of natural
experiment as to the value of contract law.  Discrete market participants
contracted before the crash and then pursued their rights in court after-
wards, while relational market participants contracted but refrained from
suing.  Given this bifurcated response to the identical stimulus, Professor
Illig queries:  why did the relational parties bother to contract in the first
place?  If they could have predicted the likelihood of their ex post inertia,
then as rational economic actors they must have valued contracting for
something other than as insurer of their reasonable expectations.  For them,
a contract must provide significant symbolic and ceremonial value.  Based
on this finding—as well as on complementary research from the field of
behavioral economics—Professor Illig concludes by arguing against a uni-
versalist approach to contract law.  Instead, he recommends that contract
doctrine be evolved to reflect its dual nature—as insurer of expectations in
the context of discrete exchanges and as a source of imagery and ritual in
the context of relational affiliations.  Doing so would enhance the impact of
social norms as a mechanism for avoiding and resolving disputes.
I. INTRODUCTION
“Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?”
“To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.”
“The dog did nothing in the night-time.”
“That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes.1
* Associate Professor and Dean’s Distinguished Faculty Fellow, University of
Oregon School of Law.  E-mail:  rillig@uoregon.edu.
1. ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 1,
22 (1903).
49
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Looking back, we can say without risk of hyperbole that the subprime
mortgage crisis of 2008 constituted the largest single disruption to the
American economy since the onset of the Great Depression.  It resulted in
massive wealth destruction, unemployment for millions, and a worldwide
recession that in many ways rivals that of the 1930s.
For legal and other scholars, however, the crash might be viewed more
as boon than bane.  Its awesome size, its abrupt onset and swift conclusion,
and the fact that it was generally unforeseen all combine to create near-
ideal circumstances to consider a series of natural experiments.  By com-
paring the behavior of various market players in the aftermath of the tur-
moil, we can uncover insights about their interests and incentives that lay
hidden during more placid times.
One such natural experiment involves the enforcement value of con-
tract rights.  We can observe, for example, that countless lawsuits were
filed to vindicate the many contract rights that were breached as a result of
the economic turmoil.  Noticeably absent, however, was significant litiga-
tion among the surviving investment banks, pension funds, insurance com-
panies, and other major American financial institutions.  For the most
part, the financial elite didn’t sue one another, though they had ample
cause to do so.  Their dogs, in other words, didn’t bark.
This incongruent behavior is best explained by reference to the pio-
neering law and sociology work of contracts scholars like Ian Macneil, one
of the originators of relational contract theory.  These non-suing financial
institutions are repeat players in a close-knit market who depend upon
long-term, face-to-face relationships with their counterparties in order to
prosper.  In Macneil’s lexicography, the industry we call Wall Street is
comprised of a web of “relational contracts.”2
What Macneil’s work fails to address, however, is a deeper question
that lies hidden within the rubble of the market collapse.  If these rela-
tional market participants knew or could have predicted that they would
never sue, why did they expend the time and expense of contracting in the
first place?  In other words, what is the purpose and value of contract law
for relational contractors?
Both classical and neo-classical contracts theory assume that the pri-
mary value of a contract lies in its enforceability.  The answer to “why
contract?” has always been the suggestion that contract rights provide a
guaranty of one’s reasonable expectations.3  If one’s counterparty cannot
or will not perform, a court will force it to do so—subject only to the
2. See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO
MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980).
3. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.3 (4th ed. 2004) (“From the perspec-
tive of society as a whole, the function of the law of contracts might have been seen as
furthering the general economic good by encouraging parties to enter into . . . productive
transactions.  From the perspective of the parties themselves, the function might have been
viewed more narrowly as aiding them in planning for the future by protecting their
expectations.”).
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limitations imposed by federal bankruptcy law—and thereby assist the ag-
grieved party to realize the anticipated results of her deal.  Written con-
tracts, viewed in this light, serve as a form of governmentally enforced
insurance.
In the wake of the crash, however, we see evidence of something far
more complex and important taking place.  The disinclination of institu-
tional investors to sue one another suggests that they value their long-term
relationships with their counterparties more than they value the potential
recovery of their short-term losses.  But if they never intended to enforce
their rights—or if they were sufficiently rational and self-aware as to be
able to predict that they would not do so—then their primary purpose for
contracting must have been something other than to insure their reasona-
ble expectations.
The purpose of this Article is to focus on why a relational market
player might value contract law if not to obtain enforceable contract
rights.4  In this respect, it is in many ways the inverse of the work of Stew-
art Macaulay, the other great pioneer (along with Macneil) of relational
contract theory.  For him, the interesting question was why players in cer-
tain industries chose not to operate pursuant to formal, written contracts.5
For me, the question is just the opposite—why contract at all?  Indeed, the
aftermath of 2008 suggests that for relational contractors opting out may
not be the anomalous state.  The true oddity, it seems, is that any of them
bothered to opt in.
The solution to this conundrum appears to lie in the multiple functions
that contract law affords.  In addition to having enforcement value, con-
tracts also have value as symbols and sources of ritual.  Whether or not a
contracting party ever sues to enforce her rights, she benefits from the
imprimatur of sophistication and insider status that is provided by the exis-
tence of a properly crafted agreement.  Likewise, the ceremonial act of
negotiating and entering into a contract provides value by helping the par-
ties bond and by highlighting for them their transition from economic
strangers to co-adventurers.6  Thus, many relational market participants
may value contracting not solely or even primarily as a guaranty of their
reasonable expectations, but as a symbol and a rite of passage.  This possi-
bility is supported by parallel findings in behavioral economics.7
4. See Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 91,
97 (2003) (noting that, in most transactions, “legal doctrine is obscure, and the threat of legal
enforcement is remote; yet actors often invest substantial resources into producing written
contracts.”).
5. See generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Prelimi-
nary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) (describing the results of in-person interviews with
sixty-eight businessmen and lawyers about the value of contract law).
6. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.) (distinguish-
ing long-term business partners, whom he labeled “co-adventurers,” from the discrete con-
tractors whom he viewed as comprising “the crowd”).
7. See infra Part IV.B.
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In Part II of this Article, I describe the contours of this particular natu-
ral experiment by focusing on two categories of relational contractors—
managers and investors of hedge funds and venture capital funds.  In do-
ing so, I make two primary factual claims.  First, although these parties
elected not to sue to enforce their rights, they had cause to do so; they
were parties to enforceable contracts that were breached.  And second,
many non-relational contractors did indeed sue, suggesting that there is a
distinction between how relational and discrete market participants per-
ceive the value of contract law.  I also make several methodological obser-
vations regarding the risks and benefits inherent in this type of research.
In Part III, I describe the value that contract law provides as a source
of symbolism and ritual.  Ultimately, I conclude that the more relational
the parties’ affiliation, the more likely they are to privilege the ceremonial
and totemic functions of contracting over its traditional role as insurer of
expectations.
Finally, in Part IV, I use the results of the natural experiment to re-visit
the work of relational contracts scholars.  In particular, I question Mac-
neil’s desire for a universalist approach that seeks to treat all contracts,
relational and otherwise, as being of a kind.  Instead, I argue that the re-
sults of the experiment, coupled with complementary findings in the field
of behavioral economics, yield a different result.  Contracts are not all of a
universal type and should not be treated as such.  Rather, they fall into
multiple categories and the law should be tailored to address the particular
strengths and weaknesses of each individual contract regime.  Doing so
would have the added benefit of enhancing the impact of social norms as a
mechanism for avoiding and resolving disputes.
II. A NATURAL EXPERIMENT AS TO THE VALUE OF CONTRACT LAW
During the months of market turmoil that followed the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, many large hedge funds refused to
honor investor requests to withdraw their money.  At the same time, sev-
eral major financial institutions preemptively refused to contribute the
capital they had promised to invest in venture capital funds.  In both cases,
such actions breached the complex agreements the parties had negotiated.
In neither case did any significant number of parties sue.8
8. It is impossible to prove the negative—that absolutely no private investment fund
managers or investors sued one another.  Indeed, there were several reported cases of litiga-
tion, though such reports were isolated and frequently involved unusual circumstances. See,
e.g., Susan Pulliam, Locked In: When Hedge Funds Bar the Door, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2008, at
A1, A10, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121495893887021511.html.  However,
the general scarcity of newsworthy reports in a high-profile industry, the lack of results from
searches of online databases of court decisions, and conversations with fund managers all
suggest that the frequency of actual litigation post-2008 was disproportionately small as com-
pared to the widespread wave of contract breaches that swept through Wall Street and the
world of investment funds.
More importantly, for purposes of this Article, I do not seek to prove an absolute absence
of litigation.  Rather, I only suggest that there was a greater tendency among relational con-
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By contrast, during the same period, countless lawsuits were brought
by and against now defunct entities like Lehman Brothers as well as
against both homeowners and the banks that packaged and sold faulty
mortgaged-backed securities, among others.  There was also substantial lit-
igation between leveraged buyout funds and their target companies.9
Thus, lawsuits were common in the wake of the market collapse, just not
among an identifiable subset of relational contractors.  The result of this
disparate behavior is a naturally occurring experiment where two distinct
sets of market participants responded differently to similar economic and
legal circumstances.
In Part II, I explore the contours of this natural experiment by first
examining in-depth the nature of the private investment contracts that
were breached but not enforced, and then by comparing them with con-
tracts whose breach was enforced.  I conclude that the most likely explana-
tion for the parties’ varying responses to the widespread incidence of
breach lies in the degree of relationality inherent in their business deal-
ings.  Finally, I make several observations about both the benefits and lim-
itations of this type of research methodology.
A. The Parties
In the early 1960s, Stewart Macaulay began writing about the non-con-
tractual elements of business relationships.  In particular, he suggested
that when disputes arise between parties to complex business affiliations,
the result is often a resolution that pays little or no heed to the written
words of the contract.10  Under such circumstances, social norms, rather
than formalistic contract rights, appear to take precedence.  This insight
served as the theoretical foundation for subsequent empirical work by
scholars like Lisa Bernstein and Robert Ellickson.  They explored how
market segments operating outside of the legal system—in particular, dia-
mond merchants and cattle ranchers—organized themselves and resolved
disputes.11
Ian Macneil, while attempting to build on Macaulay’s work from a the-
oretical standpoint, made the crucial observation that contracts can be
tractors to forego resort to the legal system as a means of resolving their disputes.  To the
extent such a tendency exists, it is reasonable to surmise that parties who value contracts but
not litigation must value contract law for reasons other than its insurance function. See gen-
erally infra Part III.
9. See Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 499-
502, 510-11 (2008).
10. Macaulay, supra note 5, at 60-61.
11. See Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1745
(1996) (citations omitted) (“In applications ranging from Robert Ellickson’s seminal work on
rancher/farmer relations in Shasta Country, California, to Lisa Bernstein’s investigation of
extralegal contractual relations among wholesale diamond traders . . . an increasing number
of legal and economic scholars have shown how private systems of rules work to regulate
economic relations among the communities that adopt them.”) .
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placed on a continuum depending upon how “relational” they are.12  On
one end of Macneil’s spectrum lie one-off, spot transactions in which the
parties make discrete exchanges of goods or monies while owing one an-
other little in the way of prior or subsequent duties.  On the other end are
more complex, longer-term relationships that embody repeated dealings
and close social interactions.13
On the continuum Macneil describes, the contracts governing the rela-
tionships among the nation’s major financial institutions—the banks and
investment pools that we refer to collectively as “Wall Street”—must be
understood as occupying a space near the far end of the relational side.14
Their dealings are ongoing, face-to-face, and frequent.  The survival of any
one such institution depends on its ability to interact and trade with each
other such institution.  To use Macneil’s terminology, their myriad of iso-
lated transactions combine and interlace to create “relational patterns.”15
For purposes of this Article, I will limit the discussion to a particular
subset of these relationally oriented financial institutions—private invest-
ment funds, a category that includes hedge funds, private equity funds, and
venture capital funds, among others.  I focus on private investment funds
because they are remarkably similar to one another in terms of both for-
mal structure and financing, thereby enabling us to answer Mark
Suchman’s call for “macroscopic consideration of entire contract
regimes.”16
The structural uniformity among private investment funds results be-
cause they function primarily as alternative investment vehicles for a rela-
tively closed set of corporations, endowments, pension funds, foundations
and high-net-worth individuals, each of which is constantly inundated with
multiple, competing investment opportunities.17  The fund managers’ abil-
ity to attract capital therefore arises partly from their ability to differenti-
12. Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 877, 894 (2000) [hereinafter Macneil, Relational Contract Theory] (“Probably the most
recognized aspect of my work in contract is the use of a spectrum of contractual behavior and
norms with poles, labeled relational and discrete, respectively.”).  For a detailed description
and analysis of the spectrum, see Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL.
L. REV. 691, 737-805 (1974) [hereinafter Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts].
13. In distinguishing between discrete and relational contracts, Macneil draws on the
sociological concepts of primary and non-primary relations, whereby relational contracts fit
the model of primary relations, and discrete contracts constitute non-primary relations. See
Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, supra note 12, at 722.  A related concept is Oliver
Williamson’s distinction between markets and hierarchies. See generally Oliver E. William-
son, Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 316
(1973).
14. See generally Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, supra note 12, at 691.
15. Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 340,
345 (1983).
16. See Suchman, supra note 4, at 115 (advocating that additional scholarly attention
be devoted to the study of industry-wide contracting schemes).
17. See Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap
for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 225, 279-80 (2008).
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ate their particular investment strategy and partly from their ability to
claim some minimum level of industry-segment-specific sophistication.  By
mimicking the essential terms of their competitors’ contracts, fund manag-
ers are able to identify themselves as industry insiders who are familiar
with how the game is played, while simultaneously shifting the focus of
attention of their potential clients away from seemingly boring legal nice-
ties and onto the issue of the managers’ particular investment prowess.  As
a result of the managers’ need to repeatedly solicit the same sources, gen-
erally offering terms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, a robust and transparent
(though exclusive) market has evolved among the fund managers and their
investors.  The result is uniformity with respect to legal structure coupled
with differentiation of investment strategy or prowess.18
As a test subject, however, the upside of the industry’s overall uniform-
ity would appear to be outweighed by the downside of its secrecy.  After
all, the specific details of the contracts governing any given private invest-
ment fund are generally not public and thus would appear largely unknow-
able to those outside the particular transaction.19  Fortunately, this is not
the case.  Because of ongoing efforts by institutional investors seeking
transparency in industry-standard financial arrangements, it is possible for
outside observers to generalize regarding fund contracts with a fair
amount of confidence.  For example, in 1996, a group of nine state retire-
ment and pension funds commissioned a private study of common invest-
ment terms.20  Presumably, the consulting firm that conducted the study
had access to a large store of actual fund documents from the sponsoring
states when preparing its summaries.  Meanwhile, Dow Jones, among
others, has followed the consultants’ lead and begun publishing periodic
surveys of prevailing terms and conditions of private investment fund con-
tracts.21  The Securities and Exchange Commission also issued an authori-
tative survey of contract terms, though it was limited in focus to those
governing hedge funds.22
By reviewing these and other similar publications and online
databases, it is possible to consider the industry as a whole, thereby ena-
bling us to generalize across a broad but mostly uniform segment of rela-
tional market participants. Furthermore, because surveys are inherently
backward-looking, reliance in particular on the 2009 Dow Jones study
18. See Davidoff, supra note 9, at 526-35 (arguing that the consistency in private equity
deal structures is based largely on path dependency).
19. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, at
x (2003) [hereinafter SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf (noting that the Commission lacked even the most basic informa-
tion about the hedge fund industry and how it operates).
20. KEY TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING 69 (William M.
Mercer, Inc., ed. 1996) [hereinafter MERCER REPORT]. See also JAMES M. SCHELL, PRIVATE
EQUITY FUNDS:  BUSINESS STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS § 1.02[1] (2012).
21. See DOW JONES, PRIVATE EQUITY PARTNERSHIP TERMS & CONDITIONS 5 (2012)
[hereinafter PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS].
22. See SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 19, at 1-3.
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should present an accurate view of market conditions prevailing at the
time of the 2008 crash.
B. The Contracts
In order to delve more deeply into the question of why relational par-
ties contract, I attempt in Part II.B. to explicate certain key provisions of
the contracts entered into between private investment fund managers and
their investors prior to the crash of 2008.  My point is to demonstrate that
these managers and investors were in possession of material and enforcea-
ble contract rights circa 2007.  The dearth of post-crash litigation, in other
words, cannot be explained by the absence of a basis on which to sue.
In terms of overall structure, private investment funds are typically or-
ganized as limited partnerships.  Wealthy investors contribute the bulk of
the monies and serve as passive limited partners, while professional man-
agers form an entity to serve as the general partner and select and admin-
ister the funds’ investments.23  The funds themselves lack any real
operations but rather serve as pools of cash aggregated for investment
purposes.
Within the private investment fund industry, however, there is a fair
amount of contractual variation as between funds with different invest-
ment styles.  In particular, venture capital funds generally enter into con-
tracts that differ in important ways from those of hedge funds.  As a result
of these differences, it is the venture capital fund investors who appear to
have engaged in post-2008 breach, while in the case of hedge funds, it was
the managers who were at fault.  The complimentary yet contrasting na-
ture of the two sets of funds therefore makes them ideal for comparison.
Though their contractual relationships differ in detail, the funds them-
selves appear to have reacted to the crash in precisely the same manner.
The remainder of this Article therefore focuses particularly on venture
capital and hedge funds as being representative of the relational contrac-
tors who chose not to sue to enforce their post-2008 breach.
Venture Capital Funds.  With respect to a typical venture capital fund,
the managers’ goal is to invest a fixed amount of capital in a relatively
small number of early stage or other non-public companies that have sig-
nificant growth potential over the relatively near term.24  Their hope, in
lay terms, is to uncover a dotcom or biotech company with the prospect of
23. See PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 21, at 6-7.  One of the
most distinctive attributes of private investment fund industry is its famous “two and twenty”
formula for compensating fund managers.  The prevailing market norm is for them to receive
an annual management fee of around two percent, theoretically intended to offset expenses,
coupled with a twenty-percent incentive fee, known as a “carried interest,” on any profits
that exceed a specified benchmark. Id. at 28, 36.
24. For a discussion of the definition of venture capital funds, see generally DOUGLAS
J. CUMMING & SOFIA A. JOHAN, VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY CONTRACTING:
AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3-7 (2009).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\2-1\MPE102.txt unknown Seq: 9  7-DEC-12 13:24
Fall 2012] The Dog That Didn’t Bark 57
exploding into profitability once it secures sufficient seed or expansion
capital—the next Google or Facebook, so to speak.
Because the genius lies in the discovery, a key issue regarding the
structure of venture capital funds is the considerable amount of time the
managers must expend in searching for appropriate investment targets
before any investments are actually made.  Indeed, during the typical
seven- to ten-year life-cycle of a venture capital fund, it may take several
years to fully invest the fund’s capital.25  Venture capital funds may there-
fore be understood as having two distinct phases—an exploratory period
at the beginning of the fund’s life, during which time the managers are
engaged in identifying appropriate investment targets, and an inactive pe-
riod at the end of the fund’s life, during which the managers wait to see
when and if their investments turn profitable.26
During the initial exploratory period, before the managers have identi-
fied any targets, venture capital funds have no need for significant investor
capital.  They do, however, have a need from the outset for commitments
of capital.  Firm commitments allow the managers both to know how much
money will be at hand when an appropriate target turns up and to credibly
negotiate with its investment targets.  Most venture capital funds are
therefore structured so that little or no money is contributed until re-
quired.  Rather, fund contracts require that investors commit to a certain
level of investment and then stand ready to inject the promised capital into
the fund as and when it is needed.27  Then, when the managers identify an
appropriate target, be it after three months or three years, they make a
capital call on the investors, who are permitted a brief amount of time
during which to contribute the requested funds (up to the maximum
amount of their commitment).28
As well as being practical, this promise-now-contribute-later scheme
serves to boost the reported performance of the fund.  Were the managers
to accept contributions prior to identifying attractive targets of opportu-
nity, they would be unable to put that capital to its best use.  Instead, they
would have no choice but to temporarily park the excess currency in some
sort of safe and liquid—and hence low-interest—investment vehicle.29
25. See id. at 5.  Many funds have requirements that if the money is not invested within
five years, any unused capital commitments must be released and the commitment canceled.
See PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 21, at 14 (reporting that 81% of
venture capital funds surveyed have an investment period of five or fewer years).
26. See PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 39-40 (4th
ed. 2000).  Indeed, it is common during these relatively less-busy later years for the fund
managers to commence a new fund, such that the exploratory and wait-and-see periods for
the two funds overlap. PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 21, at 24 (report-
ing that many fund contracts require that the managers invest between two-thirds and three-
fourths of their committed capital before being permitted to begin fundraising for a follow-on
fund).
27. PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 21, at 23-24.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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This would both lengthen the period during which the managers are re-
sponsible for providing income growth, and lower the fund’s overall return
(due to the inclusion of results from low-growth, pre-investment periods).
The consequence would be an artificially low return on capital, the princi-
pal measure by which the success of a venture capital fund is assessed.30
Thus, it isn’t merely the case that venture capital fund managers don’t
need up-front capital—the fact is that they don’t want it.
From the standpoint of the attorneys who structure the investment
contract, this system of delayed contribution creates an obvious risk.
When the time comes to call the capital, investors may be unable or un-
willing to contribute the contractually agreed-upon monies, thereby put-
ting the entire fund at risk.31  To obviate this possibility, lawyers have
devised a series of measures that make non-compliance painful.32  In fact,
in order to aid in this effort, the Delaware partnership law specifically pro-
vides an exception from the common law rule that contract remedies can-
not be punitive.33  In the case of a party’s failure to honor its capital
commitments, the contracts can be punitive—and they generally are.  One
common remedy, for example, is the ability of a fund to redeem a non-
performing investor’s remaining interest at a fraction of its value.34  The
contracts also typically omit traditional “outs” intended to soften the risk
of future downturns, such as material adverse change clauses—provisions
that allow a party to withdraw from a pending deal upon the occurrence of
significant changes in the economy or other “acts of God.”  Moreover, all
of these provisions are lengthy and detailed, and are drafted broadly so as
to be as ironclad as possible.
For the purposes of this Article, we therefore find in place prior to
2008 a set of detailed and largely uniform venture capital investment con-
tracts that combine periodic capital calls with stiff penalties for those who
do not honor their promised commitment.  The stage would seem to be set
for a massive round of post-Lehman Brothers litigation over failures by
investors to answer capital calls.
Hedge Funds. Hedge funds, by contrast, face a different set of inves-
tor-related challenges.  Unlike venture capital funds, they do not engage in
a single investment strategy.35  Instead, what unites them as a category
30. MERCER REPORT, supra note 20, at 11.
31. See PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 21, at 50.
32. Id. at 50-51 (“Often, the remedies are intentionally harsh to discourage the possi-
bility of default to the fullest extent possible . . . .”).
33. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-502(c) (2010) (“A partnership agreement may provide
that the interest of any partner who fails to make any contribution that he or she is obligated
to make shall be subject to specified penalties for, or specified consequences of, such fail-
ure.”); SCHELL, supra note 20, at § 9.04[4].
34. PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 21, at 50-51.
35. See SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 19, at viii (“Hedge funds utilize a num-
ber of different investment styles and strategies and invest in a wide variety of financial in-
struments.  Hedge funds invest in equity and fixed income securities, currencies, over-the-
counter derivatives, futures contracts and other assets.”).
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(aside from their uniform structure) is that they generally make invest-
ments that are relatively liquid and hence comparatively easy to exit.36
Again, in lay terms, they represent the day traders of the institutional in-
vestor world.  Thus, to the extent that a hedge fund is able to quickly enter
and exit investment opportunities, it faces little risk when its pool of avail-
able capital grows or shrinks.  It simply adjusts the size of its positions to
conform to its new level of resources.  As a result, such funds can operate
in a manner not unlike that of a traditional bank account or money market
fund, with an investor being theoretically free to make additional contri-
butions, or withdraw some or all of her earnings and prior contributions, at
almost any time.
In this respect, the primary risk for hedge funds vis-à-vis their investors
is that the investors will seek to redeem their interests en masse, overly
frequently, or at inopportune times, such as during a temporary market
downturn.  To deal with this risk, most hedge funds include an initial lock-
up period of one or two years during which no redemptions may be
made.37  Thereafter, redemptions are generally allowed only on fixed,
quarterly dates, and even then only upon reasonable advance notice.38
Withdrawals are thus permitted but in a regulated manner so as to be
smooth and predictable.  In fact, the structure of most hedge funds is such
that the real liquidity risk relating to the availability of funds is borne by
the investors.  After all, it is the fund managers who control the cash, and
like anyone with a bird in the hand, they can always refuse to return it.
Adding to this risk for investors is the increased prevalence among
hedge funds of additional limits on withdrawal known as “gates.”  Gates
are a relatively recent form of contractual provision that appear to come in
two forms.  One allows the fund to limit the percentage that any investor
can redeem on any given redemption date.  If the fund has a twenty-per-
cent gate, for example, no single investor is permitted to redeem more
than twenty percent of her capital at any one time.39  The other, more
36. Examples of common strategies include directional investing, event-driven invest-
ing, and various forms of price-discrepancy arbitrage. Id. at 33-36.
37. In fact, the once-traditional one-year lock-up was extended by many funds in the
face of regulation promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2004 that
applied only to funds that permitted withdrawals within their first two years of operation.
See Illig, supra note 17, at 279 n.239.  Such regulation was struck down in 2006 by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, but initial lock-ups lasting more than
one year remain fairly common. See Goldstein v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 451 F.3d 873, 877-
78, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that the SEC lacked authority to change the definition of
the term “adviser” when the definition was contained in a federal statute).
38. This is usually somewhere between thirty and ninety days, depending upon the
fund’s particular investment strategy and its bargaining power vis-à-vis its investors.  See SEC
HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 19, at ix.
39. See Jonathan Bevilacqua, Comment, Convergence and Divergence: Blurring the
Lines Between Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 54 BUFF. L. REV., 251, 263-64 (2006).
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severe form entitles fund managers to temporarily prohibit all redemp-
tions under a given set of theoretically infrequent circumstances.40
Notably for purposes of this Article, however, gates appear to be used
mostly by the subset of hedge funds that mimic the illiquid investment
strategies most often associated with leveraged buyout funds.41  Thus, al-
though the existence of gates might insulate a small number of non-tradi-
tional hedge funds from accusations that their refusal to return investor
capital resulted in a contract breach, most traditional hedge funds that
prohibit withdrawals do so in violation of their contractual
commitments.42
We therefore see a pre-2008 landscape where the majority of hedge
funds hold their investors’ monies subject to explicit contractual rights of
withdrawal.  Should they decline to honor such requests, perhaps in order
to protect their capital during a crisis like that occurring in the months
following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, these hedge funds would ap-
pear to be in breach of their written contracts.  Again, as was the case
among venture capital funds, the stage seems set for significant crash-re-
lated litigation.
C. The Breaches
Having now attained an understanding of the contractual relations that
predominated among private investment fund managers and their inves-
tors circa 2007, it is possible to study more closely the circumstances that
led to their apparent breach in 2008.  Our goal is to uncover the particular
nature of the breaches and the responses of the injured parties.
40. See SCHELL, supra note 20, § 1.05[7]. Note that there is an internal logic to this
type of flexibility that is rooted in the managers’ fiduciary duties to all investors.  For exam-
ple, many hedge funds make bets that securities markets tend to correct themselves, but such
corrections can take time to occur.  Indeed, the market not infrequently moves in the oppo-
site direction—toward increased irrationality—before eventually correcting itself. See, e.g.,
Azam Ahmed, The Hunch, the Pounce and the Kill, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2012, at BU1.  As a
result, this investment strategy requires patience and liquidity in order to be successful.  Were
a minority of investors to request that a material amount of their capital be returned during a
period while markets were moving in the wrong direction, the result could be to force the
fund to liquidate their bet at the very worst moment, thereby creating losses for all investors.
The manager’s ability to temporarily suspend redemptions can therefore be seen as a safety
valve that allows them to protect non-redeeming limited partners from the effects of pan-
icked selling.  Interview with Jamie Hague, Vice President, Millburn Ridgefield Corporation
(Aug. 10, 2010) (notes on file with the author).
41. See Stephanie Breslow & Paul S Gutman, Hedge Fund Investment in Private Eq-
uity, PLC CROSS-BORDER PRIVATE EQUITY HANDBOOK 9, 12 (June 2005), http://www.srz.
com/files/News/dbe15ae1-db3c-4b9a-95ea-7c5d55d5024b/Presentation/NewsAttachment/c0377
368-c9d2-4b70-9241-1c4d9b886749/filesfilesARTICLE-PrivateEquity2005-06—HedgeFundIn
vestmentInPrivateEquity.pdf; Bevilacqua, supra note 39, at 253 (“In some cases, hedge fund
advisers are incorporating ‘side pockets,’ ‘gates,’ and ‘lock-ups’ to the funds that they man-
age.  These fund terms facilitate illiquid investing, but blur the lines between the previously
well-defined structures of private equity funds and hedge funds.”).
42. See Gregory Zuckerman, Hedge-Fund Investor Goal: An Exit Plan, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 9, 2009, at C1.
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During the fall of 2008, in the months following the collapse of Leh-
man Brothers, private investment funds came under attack.  Contempo-
rary news reports of the crisis followed a domino-like pattern, with the
collapse of Bear Stearns, IndyMac Bancorp, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
Lehman Brothers, AIG, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, and others fol-
lowing one after another in rapid but staccato succession.43  This atmos-
phere of uncertainty created for investors a very immediate feeling of
foreboding.  According to one senior banker at JPMorgan, “It was like
watching popcorn . . . . You didn’t know where it would pop next.”44
For a time, it was popular to imagine that the next shoe to fall was the
supposedly imminent collapse of the private investment fund industry.45
The problem was not that private investment funds were to blame for the
panic, nor that their balance sheets made them more likely to fail than
other financial institutions.  Indeed, many prominent funds had bet against
the housing market and were poised to realize huge gains as a result of the
collapse of subprime mortgages.46  Rather, the broader concern lay in the
fact that the funds’ investors were themselves being squeezed, in many
cases from multiple directions at once.
First, many highly leveraged institutional investors had made unfortu-
nate bets on the direction of the mortgage industry and needed cash to
shore up their balance sheets in the face of growing losses.47  Thus, even if
they would have preferred to hold on to their private investment fund
shares, their holdings in hedge funds in particular represented a relatively
liquid asset that could theoretically be monetized at a time when nearly all
43. See generally ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF
HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND
THEMSELVES (2009).
44. ROGER LOWENSTEIN, THE END OF WALL STREET 98 (2010) (quoting an unnamed
source).
45. As an interesting side story, it is worth noting that the financial press largely called
this one wrong.  As September 30th approached—a common day for hedge funds to permit
quarterly redemptions—many commentators wondered aloud whether the market would be
hit by a sudden outflow of money from private investment funds. See, e.g., Louise Story,
Hedge Funds Are Bracing for Investors to Cash Out, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2008, at C1.  In
fact, because most funds require thirty or more days’ notice for a redemption, and because
the collapse of Lehman Brothers had occurred inside of the applicable thirty-day window
leading up to September 30th, this date did not represent a systemic gut-check on the health
and future of private investment funds.  Indeed, the entire market segment may have benefit-
ted from the luck of timing—the funds’ relative illiquidity for periods of less than ninety days
appears to have left many hedge funds largely intact during the worst days of the panic.
46. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE
(2010).
47. See, e.g., Daniel Golden, Cash Me If You Can, UPSTART BUSINESS JOURNAL (Mar.
18 2009), http://upstart.bizjournals.com/executives/2009/03/18/David-Swensen-and-the-Yale-
Model.html; Saijel Kishan, Blue Mountain Freezes $3.1 Billon Credit Hedge Fund (Update1),
BLOOMBERG.COM (Nov. 3, 2008, 5:15 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087&sid=aKeoPtrg6NbU&refer=home (noting that the fund—which had “out-
performed the industry average by almost 10-fold this year”—was nevertheless deluged with
redemption requests due to “liquidity pressures” impacting the limited partners).
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of Wall Street was scrambling for cash.  Whether these investments held
the promise of a long-term profit or loss, they represented a short-term
source of much-needed liquidity.
Second, because of accumulating losses in other portions of investors’
portfolios, the relative size of their private investment fund allocations had
grown as compared to their other holdings.  Because the value of, say,
stocks and real estate was falling faster than the reported value of private
investment funds, the mix of securities held by many institutional investors
had shifted toward a higher proportion of such alternative investments.
This phenomenon is known within the industry as the “denominator ef-
fect.”48  In order to maintain their prior mix of investments, and thus re-
main in compliance with an amalgam of regulatory requirements and
internal policies mandating a particular mix, many institutional investors
needed to reduce their private investment fund commitments for the very
reason that such investments were accruing value (and hence growing in
size) as compared to the rest of their portfolio.49  They had to sell their
private investment fund shares, in other words, not because the shares
were losers but because, as compared to many other investments, they
were winners.
Finally, many investors in venture capital funds had followed a strategy
of purposefully over-committing themselves by promising to contribute
more money than they had available.  Their assumption in doing so was
that, because the money would not be needed until an appropriate target
investment was identified sometime in the future, they could answer capi-
tal calls in a cyclical fashion using the profits they earned from prior in-
vestments to fund subsequent requests for cash.50  Thus, for example,
Duke University’s endowment found itself underwater in 2008 with re-
spect to its venture capital investments because it had not set aside enough
money to meet future capital calls.  Rather, it had assumed that there was
no need to set aside any savings because its older venture capital invest-
ments were likely to mature ahead of schedule and so provide the liquidity
needed to fund subsequent capital calls issued by a second generation of
48. See Jonathan Keehner & Jason Kelly, Harvard-Led Sale of Private-Equity Stakes
Hits Values, BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 1, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601109&sid=azBqn85aRXE (“When the value of [liquid] holdings (the denominator) is
lower, the percentage of the overall pool devoted to private equity (the numerator) rises,
pushing the percentage of illiquid asset classes like private equity too high.”).
49. Sarah Lacy, College Endowments Deserting Venture Capital, BUSINESSWEEK, Nov.
24, 2008, at 32, available at http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-11-21/college-endow
ments-deserting-venture-capitalbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-ad-
vice (noting that university endowments at Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Columbia and Duke
were all being forced to reduce their exposure to venture capital because of “strict allocation
models that dictate how much of an investment portfolio goes to what asset class.”); Keehner
& Kelly, supra note 48. See also SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 19, at 4-5 (describ-
ing the market benefits of including hedge fund securities as part of a larger portfolio of
investments).
50. Cash-Poor LPs Face Capital-Call Pressure, HEDGE FUND ALERT (Nov. 5, 2008),
http://www.hfalert.com/headlines.php?exact=1&hid=138041&s=.
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funds.51  As the panic played out, however, many older funds found it un-
wise or impossible to pay out profits at the same rate as in the past—they
simply weren’t making enough money—while many newer funds called
their capital earlier than expected.52
The result of this industry-wide capital squeeze, as it pertains to our
present inquiry, was twofold.  In the case of venture capital funds, the
cream of the crop of the nation’s institutional investors began to rebuff
attempts by fund managers to call their committed capital.53  These in-
cluded not only prominent university endowments, such as those at
Harvard, Brown, Duke, Stanford, Chicago and UVA, but also well-known
private foundations such as the Carnegie Foundation.54  Even large pen-
sion funds like CalPERS, the colossal $200 billion California public pen-
sion plan that stands astride the industry, reneged on some of its
commitments.55
In many cases, these cash-strapped investors proactively informed their
fund managers that they should not risk making upcoming capital calls
because CalPERS et al. would refuse to honor them.56  Understood as an
anticipatory repudiation of their contract obligations, such communica-
tions appeared to trigger preexisting enforcement clauses and give the
fund managers an immediate claim for total breach of contract.57  Rather
than sue, however, most of the fund managers chose instead to defer mak-
ing any further capital calls until some unknown date in the future when
their investors once again had monies to contribute.  The result of this
restraint was to spare investors the embarrassment of having to formally
renege on their commitments.
Meanwhile, with respect to hedge funds, many fund managers in 2008
and 2009 instituted involuntary lock-up periods and refused to honor the
many redemption requests with which they were inundated.58  It was as if
51. Duke Shredding Fund Stake to Raise Cash, HEDGE FUND ALERT (Oct. 29, 2008),
http://www.hfalert.com/headlines.php?exact=1&hid=137918&s=duke+shedding.
52. Id.
53. In a related development, some large investors attempted to sell their limited part-
nership interests in the highly illiquid secondary market. See, e.g., Nathan Vardi, Did
Harvard Sell at the Bottom?, FORBES.COM (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/24/
harvard-university-endowment-business-wall-street-harvard.html.  Generally, to do so would
have required the consent of the funds’ managers. See SCHELL, supra note 20, § 1.03[7].
54. Cash-Poor LPs Face Capital-Call Pressure, supra note 50.
55. Christopher Witkowsky, CalPERS: “Discussing” Capital Call Timings with GPs




57. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 8.20, at 583 (“With the notable exception of Massa-
chusetts, courts have accepted the general rule that an anticipatory repudiation gives the
injured party an immediate claim to damages for total breach, in addition to discharging that
party’s remaining duties of performance.”) (citations omitted).
58. See, e.g., Matthew Goldstein, Hedge Funds Frozen Shut, BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 5,
2008, at 25, available at http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-03-04/hedge-funds-frozen-
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\2-1\MPE102.txt unknown Seq: 16  7-DEC-12 13:24
64 Michigan Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law [Vol. 2:49
the hedge funds had become Depression-era banks experiencing a run.  In
response, they closed their doors and declared themselves a holiday.  Re-
demptions would be honored—assuming the market recovered and the
losses eventually recouped—but not in the near term.59  Comparatively
liquid investments in hedge funds had suddenly become illiquid and
uncertain.
Admittedly, a small minority of these hedge-fund lock-ups appear to
have been permitted, or in some cases mandated, by the terms of the in-
vestment contracts’ gating provisions.  Most, however, were made without
clear contractual authority.60  Moreover, where hedge funds were relying
on previously negotiated gates, many contemporary industry observers be-
lieved that such reliance was unfounded and that the true purpose of the
gates was being subverted during a time of crisis.61  They claimed that, by
retaining investors’ money, the fund managers were able to continue
charging hefty management fees at a time when most financial players
were finding profits elusive.62  Both the curbs on redemption and the use
of gates therefore appear to have been in violation of at least the spirit,
and in many cases the letter, of the parties’ contractual language.
What we find, then, in the wake of the subprime mortgage meltdown,
was a situation where large numbers of venture capital fund managers and
hedge fund investors had cause to enforce their carefully crafted but
shut (reporting that at least twenty-four hedge funds had barred limited partners from with-
drawing their investments during the period November 2007 to March 2008); Katherine Bur-
ton, Deephaven Freezes Multistrategy Hedge Fund to Avoid Asset Sales, BLOOMBERG.COM
(Oct. 31, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
amUk8rPKk9VU&dbk; Robert Wenzel, Nobel Prize Winner Scholes Freezes His Hedge
Fund After Losses, ECONOMICPOLICYJOURNAL.COM (Nov. 21, 2008), http://www.economic
policyjournal.com/2008/11/nobel-prize-winner-scholes-freezes-his.html.  The redemption
squeeze also worked its way up to the various funds of funds that are themselves investment
pools that purchase shares in traditional private investment funds.  Christine Williamson, Li-
quidity Problems Are Slowing Redemptions, PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, Oct. 5, 2009, at 1.
59. Meanwhile, funds like Ritchie Capital, which had seen its assets plunge from al-
most $4 billion to around $2 billon, took a middle ground and asked investors to vote on a
plan to modify their existing contracts and permit the fund to enact ex post a three-year gate.
Pulliam, supra note 8, at A10. Given the alternative—massive losses and a complete shutter-
ing of the fund—it is not surprising that investors approved the plan. Id. at A10.
60. Zuckerman, supra note 42, at C1-C2. See also Alistair Barr, Ore Hill Redeems
Itself with Man Group’s Help, MARKETWATCH, (June 9, 2010, 11:08 AM), http://www.
marketwatch.com/story/ore-hill-redeems-itself-with-man-groups-help-2010-06-09 (“While
[the imposition of lock-ups] prevented forced selling at the bottom of the market, some in-
vestors vowed never again to put money with the managers involved.”).
61. Gregory Zuckerman, Hedge Funds Make It Hard to Say Goodbye, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 10, 2008, at D1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120779146932503651.html
(reporting on several billion-dollar hedge funds that restricted redemptions in March).
62. Alistair Barr, Hedge Funds Try to Hold Back Redemption Wave, MARKETWATCH
(Nov. 28, 2008), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/hedge-funds-try-to-hold-back-wave-of-
investor-redemptions?pagenumber=1 (citing anonymous industry insiders as observing that
“managers of these funds may be locking up investors’ money so they can keep collecting
fees to run their businesses . . . . Without longer lockups, managers would have to sell all the
assets and shut down.”).
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breached contracts.  For the most part, however, they opted not to.  The
dog didn’t bark.
D. The Control Group
In marked contrast to the absence of lawsuits among relational con-
tractors, the market for discrete contractors in the years following the col-
lapse of Lehman Brothers has been rife with litigation.  The most obvious
evidence for this is the large number of foreclosures that were (and con-
tinue to be) instigated against homeowners who defaulted on their mort-
gages.63  Certainly, we witness no hesitation on the part of banks to resort
to legal action in the face of widespread breach.  And while the typical
American mortgage often lasts as long as thirty-years, giving it the superfi-
cial appearance of relationality, such a contract stands much closer to the
discrete end of Macneil’s spectrum.  Once the loan documents are signed,
the ongoing relationship involves little more than a homeowner’s forward-
ing of a monthly check to a faceless post office box.  Indeed, it is practi-
cally the norm in the twenty-first century for the originator of the loan to
promptly sell it upstream for packaging into some form of securitized (and
thus anonymous) debt obligation.64  Many observers blame the entire sub-
prime crisis on the degree to which personalized mortgage lending has
been replaced by an economy of discrete transactors.65
Another area of frequent litigation involved investors who had pur-
chased securitized home mortgages in the belief that they represented se-
cure assets only to see their value plummet in the face of the slowdown in
home prices.66  Similar litigation also took place among investors in
money market funds who found that their supposedly super-safe invest-
ments were not as safe as they had believed.67  And finally, of course,
Bernie Madoff’s massive Ponzi scheme, once it was discovered, led inevita-
bly to a massive tangle of litigation.68  In each of these three cases, the
63. See, e.g., Jim Wilson, Foreclosures (2012 Robosigning and Mortgage Servicing Set-
tlement), N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/f/foreclo
sures/index.html (last updated Apr. 2, 2012) (“All told, roughly four million families lost their
homes to foreclosure between the beginning of 2007 and early 2012.”).
64. Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the So-
cial Capital Response, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 289-91 (2008).
65. See, e.g., id. at 295 (“Instead of the traditional relationship, which involved a bor-
rower and a federally regulated lending institution, the new borrower and lender relationship
is often mediated by a mortgage broker with unclear loyalties.”).
66. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Financial Crisis Provides Fertile Ground for Boom in
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2008, at B1; Gretchen Morgenson, Pools That Need Some
Sun, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2010, at BU1.
67. See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, Suit Claims Fund Gave a Heads Up, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 2008, at C1.
68. See, e.g., Graham Bowley & Peter Lattman, 1,000’s Cases Are Headed for Court as
Trustee Seeks Madoff Spoils, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2010, at B1 (“With the final deadline for
litigation having passed at midnight on Saturday, at least 1,000 individual civil lawsuits will
now go forward to try to recover more than $50 billion for the victims of the global Ponzi
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litigants were either retail investors with no expectation of entering into a
long-term relational affiliation with their counter-parties, or an institu-
tional investor that for one or another reasons did not anticipate engaging
in future dealings with its former business partners.69
Indeed, although much of the non-relational litigation involved retail
investors, there are anecdotal instances where large and sophisticated Wall
Street institutions resorted to legal action.70 This occurred only after the
nature of their relational attachments was altered, however.  The best ex-
ample of this phenomenon is Lehman Brothers, the firm whose demise
most directly gave rise to the crash itself.  In the exception that proves the
rule, it brought suit against a number of former business partners, includ-
ing two Wall Street titans, Barclays and JPMorgan Chase, with whom it
had numerous, overlapping and long-term business arrangements.71
At first glance, Lehman’s energetic resort to the legal system might
seem to disprove my primary factual claim in that the web of interwoven
trades that characterize the dealings between and among banks and invest-
ment banks like Lehman Brothers, Barclays and JPMorgan Chase appear
to be highly relational.72  However, the plaintiff in these cases was not
Lehman Brothers the Wall Street investment bank with an ongoing inter-
est in protecting its reputation with other major Wall Street players, but a
bankrupt Lehman Brothers operating under the protection of a court-
sponsored reorganization.73  As an essentially defunct entity whose pri-
mary business activity was to assemble its assets and pay its creditors, Leh-
scheme orchestrated by Bernard L. Madoff.”). See generally DIANA B. HENRIQUES, THE
WIZARD OF LIES: BERNIE MADOFF AND THE DEATH OF TRUST (2011).
69. See, e.g., Harold Brubaker, N.J. Suing Lehman Officials: The State, Which Wants to
Recoup Pension-Fund Losses Could Not File Against the Defunct Firm, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Mar. 18, 2009, at C1 (bankrupt Lehman Brothers as defendant); Glater, supra note 66, at B1;
Nelson D. Schwartz & Kevin Roose, U.S. Sues 17 Mortgage Institutions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3,
2011, at B1 (US government as plaintiff); Louise Story & Gretchen Morgenson, A.I.G. Sues
Bank of America Over Mortgage Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011, at A1 (taxpayer-con-
trolled A.I.G. as plaintiff).
70. See, e.g., Banks Said to Settle Suit over Mortgage Lender, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2009,
at B2.
71. See Michael J. de la Merced, Lehman’s Estate Is Suing Barclays Over Unit’s Sale,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2009, at B8 (seeking $5 billion in damages); Mike Spector & Susanne
Craig, Lehman Files Suit Versus J.P. Morgan—Bankruptcy Estate Claims Inside Knowledge
Used to Make Collateral Calls; Bank Calls It ‘Meritless’, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2010, at C3
(seeking $8.6 billion in damages). See also Julie Creswell, Lawyer’s for Lehman Are Seeking
Records from Hedge Funds and Goldman, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2010, at B4.
72. See Alison M. Hashmall, After the Fall: A New Framework to Regulate “Too-Big-
To-Fail” Non-Bank Financial Institutions, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 829, 836-39 (2010) (arguing that
the interconnectedness of modern banks and non-bank financial institutions creates systemic
risk for the entire economy).
73. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, at A1.  Consider, as well, lawsuits by and against A.I.G., the formerly
private insurance giant now controlled by taxpayers. See, e.g., Serena Ng & Carrick Mol-
lenkamp, Accusations Fly in a Faulty-Mortgage Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2010, at C3
(describing a lawsuit filed against A.I.G.); Story & Morgenson, supra note 69, at A1 (detail-
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man Brothers was the epitome of a non-relational contracting party.74
And with little interest in the future of its relationships, it did exactly what
traditional contract theory would predict—it sought refuge in the legal sys-
tem in an attempt to realize its reasonable expectations regarding its short-
term business dealings.
Litigation was also ubiquitous within a corner of the private investment
fund industry itself—albeit one in which the dealings were much less rela-
tional than those existing between the fund managers and investors that
are the subject of this Article.  According to research done by Steven Da-
vidoff, many private equity funds, a type of fund that specializes in lever-
aged and other buyouts, reneged on their pre-2008 promises to acquire
their target companies.  Instead, when the time came to close the deal,
they claimed that the circumstances had changed and refused to pay the
agreed upon purchase price.75  Rather than forgive their defaulting
counter-parties, as did many hedge fund investors and venture capital fund
managers, the target companies in these expected leveraged buyouts for
the most part sued.  Prominent cases involved such industry brand names
as Cerberus Capital, Providence Equity Partners, and even the famed
Blackstone Group.76
Again, however, as with the example of the bankrupt Lehman Broth-
ers, we find that the litigation was commenced primarily by non-relational
contractors.  According to Davidoff, the contracts that leveraged buyout
funds enter into with their targets constitute “short-term relational agree-
ment[s].”77 Examined more closely, however, the contracts at issue appear
to have been much less relational than one might have assumed.  In partic-
ular, because the deals had not yet been consummated when the breaches
occurred, any long-term relationship that was to have existed among the
parties had not yet begun.  To analogize, the breaches represented not so
much a divorce ending years of marriage as the breaking off of a much-
anticipated engagement.  Regrettable, surely, but not as wrenching to ex-
isting familial relations and patterns.  In addition, the target companies
who initiated the litigation had anticipated making a once-in-a-lifetime
ing lawsuits brought by A.I.G. against Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase,
and Deutsche Bank).
74. Adam Davidson, Dead Bank Walking, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 16, 2012, at
16 (“Lehman Brothers is having a great year . . . .  Except that Lehman’s sole objective is to
sell everything it owns so it can repay its lenders and disappear.”).
75. Davidoff, supra note 9, at 499-502, 510-11.  Davidoff blames the failure of private
equity funds to complete these deals on a number of factors, among which was the presence
of certain contractual provisions that gave the funds both bargaining power and reputational
cover in a severely deteriorating market.  For example, several deals included MAC clauses
that permitted the acquirer to exit the deal in the event of a material adverse change in
economic conditions. Id. at 500-01.  Several others included a relatively new innovation—
reverse termination fees—that allowed acquirers to withdraw from a pending deal by paying
a predetermined fee (often about three percent of the acquisition price). Id. at 496-97, 499.
76. Id. at 502-10.
77. Id. at 531.
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sale.  As such, they were not repeat players who needed to protect their
reputations in order to engage in multiple transactions within a particular
market sector over an extended period.  Unlike their counter-parties, their
involvement in the world of private equity was a one-time affair.
The widespread presence of litigation within various non-relational
sectors of the post-crisis economy, including even a corner of the private
investment fund world, thus stands in stark contrast to the dearth of litiga-
tion to be found between private investment fund managers and investors.
Though similarly situated in terms of their economic context and the over-
all regulatory environment, many discrete transactors did resort to legal
remedies to secure their reasonable expectations.  For those not involved
in relational affiliations, the insurance function of contract law, as pre-
dicted by traditional theory, appears to have held significant value.
E. The Results
We have now determined the contours of our natural experiment.  The
market disruptions caused by the subprime mortgage crisis presented an
outside stimulus.  Market participants, both discrete and relational, en-
tered into contracts before the crash that appear to have been breached
after the crash.  But while most non-relational contractors sought to en-
force their rights by resort to the judicial system, at least one subset of
relational contractors did not.
The most interesting question that now presents itself is why the rela-
tional contractors entered into enforceable agreements ex ante if it was
foreseeable that they would never sue to enforce their rights in the event
of breach.  For a rational economic actor, why contract if you know you
won’t sue?
Before moving on, however, we must first take a brief detour in this
Part II.E and address an assumption that is built into this question.  Inter-
preting the parties’ inaction as indicative of their preferences assumes that
their inaction was volitional.  If, on the other hand, these players in the
private investment fund markets would have preferred to sue but were
somehow unable, then their preferences must remain hidden and it would
be overstepping the data to conclude that they did not fully value the en-
forcement function of contract law.  Thus, we must first inquire into
whether the parties’ desire to sue was thwarted due to a lack of resources
or the impact of regulatory pressures, whether they preferred to act in
response to the breaches but in an extra-legal capacity, and whether 2008
was simply so anomalous as to have resulted in a suspension of the normal
rules of the game.  Having assessed and then dismissed these possibilities,
we can safely conclude that it is the particular economic calculus faced by
relational contractors that led them to value their long-term relationships
more highly than their short-term losses.  Only then, safe in the knowledge
that their inaction was indeed indicative of their preferences, can we ask
the more profound question—why contract if not to create enforceable
rights?
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Thwarted Desire to Sue.  It is possible that the results of the natural
experiment—a dearth of lawsuits among relational contractors as com-
pared to discrete contractors—may best be explained by a finding that all
of the parties crafted their agreements with the intention of enforcing
them, but that, when the breaches occurred, only the relational contractors
found they lacked the resources or sophistication to gain access to the
courts.  Alternatively, the relational contractors may have preferred to sue
but been subject to outside pressures from regulators or others that lim-
ited their ability to behave in the manner they desired.  For one or another
reasons, their silence in the face of breach may have been, on some level,
involuntary.
Such a possibility is highly unlikely, however, given our choice of sub-
jects.  The world of private investment funds simply does not easily yield
to a narrative of imbalances of power or informational asymmetries—at
least not with the fund managers on the losing end.  In the first place,
private investment fund managers and investors represent the elite of the
financial world.  Even as the nation’s economy struggled to recover from
the collapse of its credit markets, the twenty-five highest paid hedge fund
managers of 2009 took home an average of over $1 billion in compensa-
tion.78  Meanwhile, private investment fund investors are often prohibited
from investing in even the smallest funds unless they satisfy the Invest-
ment Company Act’s test for “qualified purchasers.”79  To satisfy this test,
investors who are natural persons must maintain a portfolio valued at $5
million, while entities must have portfolios in excess of $25 million.80
Moreover, many funds require such large commitments as to make trifling
even this level of wealth.81
Thus, given the extent of their resources, as well as the market savvy
that seems likely to accompany such wealth, it appears highly doubtful
that the failure of private investment fund managers and investors to sue
can be attributed to some infirmity affecting them more severely than
those market participants who did in fact opt to sue.  If they didn’t litigate,
78. The overall winner, David Tepper of Appaloosa Management, netted in excess of
$4 billion.  Nelson D. Schwatz & Louise Story, Pay of Hedge Fund Managers Roared Back
Last Year, N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 2010, at C1 (recounting data compiled by AR+Alpha, a
widely read industry newsletter).  By comparison, H. Lawrence Culp, Jr., the Danaher chief
identified by Forbes magazine as the nation’s highest paid executive, brought home just over
$140 million.  Scott DeCarlo, What the Boss Makes, FORBES.COM (Apr. 28, 2010 6:00 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2010/04/27/compensation-chief-executive-salary-leadership-boss-10-
ceo-compensation-intro.html.  Even this comparatively paltry sum is misleadingly large, how-
ever, given that most of Culp’s compensation came from the vesting of stock options, which
take several years to accrue.
79. See SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 19, at 68-70.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A) (2012).  Smaller funds organized pursuant to Invest-
ment Company Act Section 3(c)(1) can be opened to up to 100 non-Qualified Purchasers but
still are generally limited to “accredited investors.” See SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra
note 19, at 11-15.
81. Illig, supra note 17, at 288-92.
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it probably wasn’t because they were less able to do so than their non-
relational contract parties.
As regards the possibility that the fund managers and investors were
operating under the burden of regulation and so were not able to act
freely, we can again discount this likelihood based on the nature of the
industry.  Because they cater to wealthy and institutional investors—
whom Congress and the Securities Exchange Commission generally as-
sume to be capable of protecting themselves—private investment funds
are free from most disclosure and other securities law obligations.82  In-
deed, so long as they accept contributions only from wealthy investors, the
funds operate in something approaching a regulatory vacuum.  It would
appear, then, that there is little risk that their passivity in the face of
counterparty breach was the result of a lesser store of free will than ex-
isted in the marketplace generally.  Had the fund managers or investors
wanted to sue, the regulatory environment would not have thwarted their
desire.
Preference for Extra-Legal Enforcement Mechanisms. A second pos-
sibility is that the near absence of post-2008 lawsuits among relational con-
tractors could be explained by a preference for extra-legal problem
solving.  The parties may have genuinely desired to press their rights and
resolve their disputes, but via a mechanism other than the American judi-
cial system.
In her paper on the diamond industry’s preference for out-of-court dis-
pute resolution, for example, Lisa Bernstein argues that an industry seg-
ment will tend to develop extra-legal norms in situations where contract
remedies are inadequate.83  Based on her analysis, it is possible to query
whether private investment funds may have avoided resorting to the
American legal system in 2008 because they believed that traditional no-
tions of contract law would not guaranty their expectations as well or as
efficiently as would privately created sanctions.  Factors that tend toward
this conclusion include the fund industries’ preference for secrecy and the
uncertainty associated with the courts’ calculation of expectancy
damages.84
There are important differences between the 2008 credit crisis and the
diamond industry of the early 1990s, however.  In particular, it appears
that the diamond industry studied by Bernstein had opted en masse and ex
ante to avoid the use of legally enforceable contracts, not merely to eschew
their enforcement in particular instances of breach.85  By contrast, the pri-
82. Id. at 275-78.  The most notable exception to this broad lack of federal regulatory
oversight is the parties’ continued liability for securities fraud, which generally cannot be
avoided. Id.
83. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:  Extralegal Contractual Relations
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 135 (1992).
84. See id. at 135-38 (discussing the factors that make the rules of the American legal
system inappropriate for the 1990s worldwide diamond market).
85. Id. at 115 (“The diamond industry has systematically rejected state-created law.”).
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vate investment fund industry relies emphatically on multiple, lengthy,
carefully drafted and legally enforceable contracts.  Likewise, 1990s dia-
mond dealers frequently challenged one another in front of a private judi-
cial body of their own creation, whereas private investment funds appear
to have avoided pressing their rights altogether.86
Thus, the situation faced by the two groups is an almost exact in-
verse—private investment funds appear to value contracts yet shun dis-
putes and formal dispute-resolution systems, whereas diamond dealers
engage in disputes with some frequency yet avoid entering into legally en-
forceable obligations.  We can therefore safely discount the possibility that
the lack of post-2008 private investment fund litigation was indicative of
an industry-wide decision to opt out of American contract law in favor of a
private dispute resolution mechanism.  They didn’t create an alternative
mechanism for resolving their disputes.  Rather, they left their disputes
unresolved.
Implied Covenant of Force Majeure.  A third possible explanation for
the lack of significant litigation may lie in the fact that the financial col-
lapse of 2008 was itself, though perhaps foreseeable, for the most part un-
foreseen.  A handful of short-sellers placed early bets on the future
collapse of the US home mortgage market, and some investors foresaw the
collapse before others.87  Yet, for the most part, the backstory to the mar-
ket panic lies in the massive delusion that had overtaken nearly all of Wall
Street.  The crash, however improbable it sounds, took almost everyone by
surprise.88
On a purely anecdotal level, one senses a lack of palpable anger di-
rected by fund managers and investors at their counterparties.  According
to many managers, for example, their investors did not overreach or make
unreasonable promises.  Rather, they—like the managers themselves—
were the victims of unforeseen events that had little historical precedent.89
Many of these relational market participants simply do not appear to have
believed that their business partners did anything wrong in the cosmic jus-
tice sense, but were instead just as much victims as they.  Whether such
feelings—if accurate beyond a few isolated examples—were the result of
86. Id. at 124 (reporting that an average of about 150 disputes each year are submitted
for resolution by the New York Diamond Dealers Club).
87. For a thoughtful and entertaining account of some of the hedge fund managers
who profited greatly by predicting the crash, see generally LEWIS, supra note 46.  Others
credited with forecasting the collapse include the likes of Nobel prize-winning economist
Joseph Stiglitz and Nobel hopeful Nouriel Roubini. See, e.g., Nouriel Roubini, Why Central
Banks Should Burst Bubbles, 9 INT’L FIN. 87 (2006); Joseph Stiglitz, Dealing with Debt: How
to Reform the Global Financial System, HARV. INT’L REV., Spring 2003, at 54. See also NAS-
SIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN (2007).
88. See LEWIS, supra note 46, at 256 (“The people on the short side of the subprime
mortgage market had gambled with the odds in their favor.  The people on the other side—
the entire financial system, essentially—had gambled with the odds against them.”).
89. See, e.g., Interview with David Chen, Principal, Equilibrium Capital Grp. (Apr. 2,
2010) (notes on file with the author).
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years of partnership and common purpose or a reflection of the troubled
times, a general feeling seemed to prevail that all of Wall Street was in it
together—mutual victims of unforeseeable events.  Thus, given that nearly
everyone on Wall Street was affected and no one party seemed signifi-
cantly more culpable than any other, the game of finance may have re-
quired a temporary suspension of the rules.  Like the cattle ranchers
described by Robert Ellickson, Wall Street may have its own set of norms
to follow and those norms might include an occasional cease-fire.90
Indeed, there is ample precedent for a type of contractual time-out to
be found in the nation’s great opus of privately negotiated executory con-
tracts.  It is common in many negotiated transactions, for example, to in-
clude a material adverse change provision.  “MAC” clauses, as they are
known, permit one party or the other to terminate a pending contract
before the deal is consummated in the event of significant changes in the
value of the transaction.91  In this sense, modern MAC clauses are simply
updated and refined versions of force majeure or act of God provisions.92
When the world goes haywire, the parties can cancel their deal without
blame or negative repercussions.
Meanwhile, contract law itself includes various equitable doctrines,
such as frustration of purpose, impracticability, and mutual mistake, which
can be used under certain circumstances to argue against holding a breach-
ing party liable.93  Although such doctrines do not have application in the
absence of a lawsuit, they carry significant persuasive and educational
power.  The parties to private investment fund contracts may thus have
internalized the law’s normative lessons, thereby making them more sym-
pathetic to crisis-related breach.
As appealing as this image of a selfless Wall Street sounds, however,
and although the subprime mortgage crisis was in many ways extraordi-
nary, it is unlikely that the near absence of private investment fund litiga-
tion can be explained entirely by the unusual post-crash atmosphere.  For
one thing, as noted above, MAC clauses are almost universally rejected in
the context of private investment fund contracts.  Indeed, venture capital
fund documents go to great lengths to create the exact opposite result.
90. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
91. 1 AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF BUS. LAW, COMM. ON NEGOTIATED TRANSAC-
TIONS, MODEL ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT WITH COMMENTARY 98-100 (2001). Gener-
ally, the contracts specify what developments qualify as a MAC, and what developments
don’t. Typically, changes in “the business, operations, prospects, assets, results of operations
or condition (financial or other) of Seller” qualify as an excuse, id. at 98, whereas develop-
ments that affect the seller’s industry as a whole or that result from the announcement of the
transaction do not. Id.
92. See 6 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A COMPREHENSIVE
TREATISE ON THE WORKING RULES OF CONTRACT LAW § 1324 (1962).
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1979) (discharge by supervening
frustration); id. at § 261 (discharge by supervening impracticality); id. at § 152 (mutual
mistake).
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Parties who fail to perform are subject to harsh penalties whatever the
cause.  In addition, recent caselaw that interprets MAC clauses narrowly
may suggest a shift in thinking.  For example, in 2001, the Delaware Chan-
cery Court held that a $100 million write-down by IBP, combined with a
40% downgrade in its reported earnings, was not sufficient to trigger the
negotiated MAC clause and so release Tyson Foods from its obligation to
acquire IBP.94  The positive reaction to this and other similar rulings
among both academics and the practicing bar suggest a discomfort with
mechanisms that too easily release a contract party from its obligation to
perform.95  Thus, we should not be too quick to assume that the atmos-
phere on Wall Street makes parties to private investment fund contracts
eager to absolve one another of their breaches.
More importantly, there is no reason to think that this kind of industry-
wide suspension of the rules should be concentrated among hedge funds
and venture capital funds.  Rather, if 2008 was simply an anomaly with no
descriptive power, we should expect to see the same reaction by all market
participants, whether relational or discrete, not a dearth of lawsuits con-
centrated within a particular group of relational contractors.
It appears, then, that while the abnormal circumstances of the post-
crash period may have had some influence on the lack of litigation among
private investment fund managers and investors, something more was
likely going on.  To the extent this subset of relational contractors was
uncomfortable suing its business partners (though that discomfort may
have been heightened by the unusual climate prevailing in 2008-2009), we
must look to the specific attributes of the private investment fund industry
to understand its anomalous response.  Why was it that only relational
contractors forgave their counterparties’ breaches?
Reputational Economics.  As we have seen, the contracts governing
private investment funds are generally highly relational.  The funds them-
selves often last as long as seven to ten years, making such arrangements
94. See In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 67 (Del. Ch. 2001) (“To a short-
term speculator, the failure of a company to meet analysts’ projected earnings for a quarter
could be highly material.  Such a failure is less important to an acquiror who seeks to
purchase the company as part of a long-term strategy.”). See also Esplanade Oil & Gas, Inc.
v. Templeton Energy Income Corp., 889 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1989); Borders v. KRLB, Inc., 727
S.W.2d 357 (Tex. App. 1987).
95. See, e.g., Jordan A. Goldstein, The Efficiency of Specific Performance in Stock-for-
Stock Mergers, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 747, 765 (2004) (“According to Anthony Kronman, the
current state of the law with which the IBP court dealt succeeds quite well in supporting the
ex ante intent of most parties.”); Jonathon M. Grech, Comment, “Opting Out”: Defining the
Material Adverse Change Clause in a Volatile Economy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1483, 1512-14 (2003)
(noting that Tyson’s “‘penalty default rule’ produces efficient results because it forces the
buyer ‘either to take precaution or reveal the risk to the other party and pay him to assume
it.’”); Nathan Somogie, Note, Failure of a “Basic Assumption”: The Emerging Standard for
Excuse Under MAE Provisions, 108 MICH. L. REV. 81, 110 (2009) (noting that the decision in
Tyson was “consistent with the outcomes we would expect to see under the ‘basic assump-
tion’ test.”).
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true partnerships rather than one-off exchanges.96  Moreover, it is not at
all uncommon for investors to re-up with successful managers when they
organize follow-on funds, thereby extending and expanding the relation-
ship even further.97
Adding to the long-term nature of private investment fund relation-
ships is the relatively closed set of players involved in the industry.  Be-
cause of the large sums involved, the pool of potential investors is
comparatively small and surprisingly static.98  And the opposite is also
true; institutional investors have only so many high quality funds from
which to choose.  Anyone can organize a fund, but it takes talent to run
one profitably.99  The private investment fund industry thus appears to
operate like one of the close-knit communal economies studied by Bern-
stein and Ellickson.
The result is that private investment fund managers and investors rely
heavily on their reputations in order to invest and profit.  Investors fear
that if they become known as troublemakers, the most profitable funds
will spurn their money.  Likewise, managers fear that, if they gain a repu-
tation for suing their investors, their future sources of financing will dry
up.  In a small and static community, reputation is currency.100  And
within the world of private investment funds, it acts as a strong incentive
for all parties to get along and not be perceived as rocking the boat, espe-
96. PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 21, at 13.
97. See Pui-Wing Tam, Venture Capital Hits a Cash-Call Crunch, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 8,
2008, at C1 (noting that, although reneging on capital calls may constitute a breach of con-
tract, “there are few precedents for venture-capital and private-equity funds suing their in-
vestors, since they need to maintain long-term relationships with the investment
community.”).
98. Indeed, because it is unwise to invest all of one’s assets in a single asset class,
private equity fund investors must have assets well in excess of those they invest in hedge
funds and venture capital funds.  A common pension fund portfolio, for example, might be
invested primarily in traditional asset classes such as marketable securities and bonds and
only partly in “alternative investments,” a category that includes absolute return (or hedge
fund) investments, real estate, and private equity (including venture capital). See DAVID F.
SWENSEN, PIONEERING PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT:  AN UNCONVENTIONAL APPROACH TO
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT 114-18 (2000).
99. See PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 21, at 7-8 (surveying mar-
ket conditions circa 2006-2007 and concluding that investors “are demanding concessions that
would have been unthinkable even a year ago in exchange for their money.”); id. at 37-38
(noting that formulas for calculating manager compensation vary depending upon past
performance).
100. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 12 (2000) (“Sometimes people
keep their promises not because they fear being sued, but because they fear developing a bad
reputation.  If they develop a bad reputation, it will be harder for them to find work and to
obtain other good things in the future.”); David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial
Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 393 (1990) (“If the promisor improperly breaches his
commitments, he damages his reputation and thereby loses valuable opportunities for future
trade.”).
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cially in an atmosphere like that of 2008 in which no one player seemed
particularly more culpable than any other.101
What we encounter in the post-2008 world of private investment funds,
then, is a situation where there were strong incentives among parties to
relational contracts to avoid resort to the legal system to resolve their dis-
putes.  The decision to sue one’s business partner involves an obvious
tradeoff between short- and long-term benefits and losses.  Given the in-
herently adversarial nature of litigation, coupled with the importance of
reputation, if a relational market participant initiated a lawsuit, she would
gain only the possibility of obtaining a near-term, one-time payment while
certainly destroying a long-term financial partnership (and possibly her
reputation for fair dealing).  If, on the other hand, the relational contrac-
tor refrained from suing, she would forego the opportunity to recover a
near-term loss but retain the potential for a fruitful future.
Thus, as rational economic players, fund managers and investors most
likely believed it was in their best interests to waive any breaches in order
to maintain their standing vis-à-vis their counterparties and within their
industry.  Once the subprime dust settled and the economy found some
level of post-crash equilibrium, many investors and fund managers hoped
and expected to once again conduct business with one another.102  Ulti-
mately, then, private investment fund managers and investors didn’t sue
one another because, in the long run, they believed litigation was a losing
proposition.
The problem that this analysis raises, however, is that there is nothing
about the nature or quality of the events of 2008 that made such an eco-
nomic calculus unforeseeable (even if the particular timing and nature of
the crash may have indeed been unforeseen).  As highlighted above, the
private investment fund industry is composed of sophisticated and wealthy
participants who could have predicted that they would value their long-
term partnerships more highly than any short-term recoupment of losses.
Why, then, did they bother to contract in the first place?  Why would
rational economic players expend the resources to negotiate formal, le-
gally binding, written agreements, if not to enforce them?  Contracting is
not without transaction costs, and the process consumes a finite—and not
insignificant—resource in the form of management time and energy.  So
what is it about the American contract law regime that was appealing to
this subset of relational contractors, if not the opportunity to enforce their
negotiated rights in court?  What made them eager to contract despite
their reluctance to sue?  This is the question addressed in Part III.
101. Reputational concerns seem slightly less important with regards to the enactment
of hedge fund gates, however.  Zuckerman, supra note 61, at D3 (reporting that the stigma
associated with freezing redemptions appears to have been abating as more and more funds
did so).
102. Interview with Jay Namyet, Chief Investment Officer, University of Oregon Foun-
dation, in Eugene, Or. (April 15, 2010) (notes on file with the author).
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F. Notes on Methodology
Before addressing the question of why relational contractors might
value having a contract if not for enforcement purposes, it is important to
note several observations about this Article’s methodology.
First, I have characterized the varying responses of certain relational
and discrete contractors to the economic disruptions of 2008-2009 as con-
stituting a “natural experiment.”  Natural experiments are a form of obser-
vational study sometimes used in the social sciences as an alternative to
randomized controlled experiments.103  What distinguishes them from
other forms of observational studies is the occurrence of some arbitrary
event that appears to divide test subjects haphazardly into two groups.104
There are inherent dangers in the design of any experiment that are
especially salient in the context of a natural experiment.  Among them is
the possibility of variables existing between the two groups that the re-
searcher cannot control and which may be the real cause for the observed
results.105  Equally important is the risk that the assignment of subject
groups may not in fact be random.  Indeed, it is often the case that investi-
gators involved in natural experiments study the wrong groups and hence
draw erroneous conclusions.106
Moreover, the “natural experiment” I describe in this Article differs in
fundamental respects from a true natural experiment.  In a true natural
experiment, a single group of subjects is divided into two subgroups, only
one of which is subjected to the treatment.  In this case, however, we have
two subgroups—relational and discrete contractors—who were both sub-
jected to the identical treatment, the economic disruptions of 2008.  Thus,
it is possible that some other, unknown factor caused the players in the
private investment fund industry to both value relational contracts and dis-
like litigation.  The observed behavior may be correlated rather than casu-
ally related.107  I may also have been mistaken to divide the subjects based
on the degree of their relationality.  Some other grouping of traits may be
more significant.
103. Thad Dunning, Improving Causal inference:  Strengths and Limitations of Natural
Experiments, 61 POL. RES. Q. 282, 282 (2008) (“As the name suggests, natural experiments
take their inspiration from the experimental approach.”).  Similar to a natural experiment is
a “quasi-experiment” in which the treatment and control groups were not assigned randomly.
Id. at 289.
104. Bruce D. Meyer, Natural and Quasi-Experiments in Economics, 13 J. BUS. &
ECON. STAT. 151, 151 (1995) (“Good natural experiments are studies in which there is a
transparent exogenous source of variation in the explanatory variables that determine the
treatment assignment.”).  Typical examples of such “as if randomization” events include po-
litical redistricting, lottery results, and weather events.  Dunning, supra note 103, at 287-88.
105. Donald B. Rubin, Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized and
Nonrandomized Studies, 66 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 688, 698-99 (1974).
106. See Jasjeet S. Sekhon & Rocio Titiunik, When Natural Experiments Are Neither
Natural nor Experiments, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 35, 35 (2012).
107. See Dunning, supra note 103, at 291 (noting that it is often difficult in the social
sciences to construct experiments that yield valid causal inferences).
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Despite these risks, natural experiments can serve as valuable research
tools when considered within a larger body of research.108  They remove
the sense of artificiality that comes from watching rats maneuver through
a man-made maze or studying a computer model that seeks to approxi-
mate real life.  They also provide the opportunity to uncover relationships
or other results that may have lain hidden beyond the researcher’s imagi-
nation and thus expand the potential for surprise.
It is also possible to limit the risks associated with natural experiments
through a combination of a priori reasoning and hard thinking about both
the assignment of groups and the possible occurrence of uncontrolled vari-
ables.109  Thus, even if a particular study were to fail a rigorous test of its
design, it may prove to constitute the best available evidence of a hidden
or hard-to-measure phenomenon.
In this respect, the particular attributes of the private investment fund
industry serve to strengthen the inferences I draw from their post-crash
behavior.  Private investment fund managers and investors, as we have
seen, are in most cases highly sophisticated and have access to extensive
resources.  They are also largely unregulated and thus not influenced by
artificial legal structures.110  Given this state of affairs, one might expect
private investment funds to be better able to gain access to judicial reme-
dies and more likely to press their rights than the average economic
player.  Their characteristics as test subjects thus appear to run counter to
the most likely risks inherent in this Article’s methodology.  The fact that
the funds generally sought to avoid litigation therefore seems unlikely to
be the result of an unaccounted-for variable like wealth, sophistication, or
the impact of the political economy.  Rather, the primary variable of rela-
tionality appears, based on a priori reasoning and close observation rather
than on strict randomized experimentation, to be the most relevant factor.
More importantly, the conclusions I seek to draw in this instance do
not depend upon some absolute proof of causality.  Rather, it is sufficient
to highlight the distinctive manner in which different market participants
reacted to the wave of breaches that followed in the wake of the 2008
crisis.  Whether the variability in the parties’ responses is caused by their
relative degree of relationality or whether both are caused by some third
factor, the fact remains that an identifiable subgroup of market partici-
pants behaved in 2008-2009 in a manner that suggests they value contract
law for reasons other than as insurer of their reasonable expectations.  As
a result, whatever the cause, it is reasonable to inquire as to what value
that group does place on contract law, as well as on how contract law
should respond to such varying preferences among market players.
108. Id. at 290.
109. Rubin, supra note 105, at 700 (“In both randomized and nonrandomized studies,
the investigator should think hard about variables besides the treatment that may causally
affect [the dependent variable] and plan in advance how to control for the important ones
. . . .”); Dunning, supra note 103, at 290.
110. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
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When combined with a larger mix of research efforts, this Article’s
conclusions serve not as a definitive account of the cause of the parties’
behavior, but as a clue toward a deeper understanding as to the manner in
which they use and value contract law.  I therefore recommend this Arti-
cle’s methodology and conclusions as an important piece of a larger theo-
retical inquiry that can and should be approached simultaneously from a
variety of directions.
III. WHY RELATIONAL PARTIES CONTRACT
Classical and neo-classical approaches to contract law are both funda-
mentally oriented toward the goal of insuring the parties’ reasonable ex-
pectations.111  By putting the force of public law behind the words of a
privately negotiated contract, the state seeks to remove from commercial
transactions the risk of counterparty non-performance.112  In doing so,
contract law reduces the informational costs associated with transacting
and permits the parties to alter their economic position with relative confi-
dence.  The result is a highly functioning, modern economy in which it is
generally safe to conduct business with strangers.
That being said, the reluctance of a large and sophisticated set of rela-
tional market participants to enforce their rights post-Lehman Brothers
would appear to undercut this basic premise of contract law.  Assuming
that the fund managers and investors are rational economic players, and
that they have the wealth and savvy to make shrewd financial decisions
regarding the allocation of resources, they must have contracted for some
reason other than to obtain a government-sponsored guaranty of their ex-
pectations.  For them, the value of contract law must lie elsewhere.  Part
III therefore examines and assesses two possible justifications for rela-
tional market participants to engage in contracting that are distinct from
contract law’s function as insurer of the parties’ reasonable expectations:
symbolism and ceremony.
A. Symbolic Value
In addition to serving as an abstract store of words that create legal
consequence, a contract is an object—a piece of paper covered in ink.  As
such, it has the potential to provide value as a symbol or icon whose mere
existence may be of importance to relational market participants.  They
may value a contract not for its legally enforceable allocations of duty and
risk, but for its symbolic meaning as an imprimatur of insider status.  Ad-
ditionally, they may believe they benefit from the existence of an object
that represents a physical manifestation or totem symbolizing the parties’
close and ongoing connection.
111. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 93, § 1 (“A contract is a promise or a set of
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy. . . .”).
112. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 1.3, at 8.
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Imprimatur of Sophistication. In practice as well as in theory, almost
anyone can form a private investment fund.  Indeed, the barriers to entry
are almost non-existent.  All it takes are a few computers, a brokerage
account, some legal advice, and start-up costs.  There are even ridiculous-
sounding websites offering start-up and administrative assistance to foun-
ders of new funds.113
One of the challenges for expert fund managers, then, is how to distin-
guish oneself from the crowd.  This situation constitutes a form of the well-
known lemon effect, whereby investors potentially under-value and thus
under-invest in all funds because they cannot be sure which are the good
ones.114  To alleviate this possibility, high-quality managers must attempt
to differentiate the market by adopting a set of common yet subtle signals
that are transparent to investors but opaque to would-be new managers.
Such elements operate as a seal of approval or membership card, serving
to distinguish those with insider status from relative newcomers or other
market interlopers.
One example of such an imprimatur in the private investment fund
industry is the choice of legal counsel.  The signaling role that lawyers play
can be observed indirectly by examining the concentration of deals among
a top tier of law firms.  Rankings by Private Equity Analyst suggest that
the top four private equity/venture capital law firms provided counsel in
substantially more deals in 2008 as did the next ten firms, and that these
top fourteen advised in substantially more deals than did the next fifty-
eight.115 The market for private investment fund legal services, in other
words, is dominated by a select group of identifiable firms who advise on a
vastly disproportionate number of transactions.  Nor are these firms the
same as those that lead the most M&A or securities transactions, meaning
that we are identifying not a top tier of general business firms but a top
tier of private equity and venture capital firms.116  Knowing enough to
engage one of these firms can therefore serve as evidence of one’s sophis-
tication (or ability and inclination to purchase such sophistication).  Ac-
113. See, e.g., START A HEDGE FUND NOW, http://startahedgefundnow.com (last visited
Oct. 26, 2012); TURNKEY HEDGE FUNDS, http://turnkeyhedgefunds.com (last visited Oct. 26,
2012).
114. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality, Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970) (analogizing from the price-reducing
effects of uncertainty in used-car sales to markets generally).
115. Sabrina Willmer, Most Active Law Firms, DOW JONES PRIVATE EQUITY ANALYST,
May 2009, at 22-23, available at www.goodwinprocter.com/files/otherarticles/PE%20analyst
%20.pdf (ranking seventy-two firms based on self-reported data).  Meanwhile, Davidoff re-
ports that as few as twenty-two law firms were involved in 91% of all large LBO private
equity investments in target companies between 2004 and 2007.  Davidoff, supra note 9, at
535-37.
116. For recent rankings of law firms advising on mergers and IPOs, see League Tables
of Legal Advisors to M&A for Year End 2011, MERGERMARKT.COM, (Jan. 13, 2012),
http://www.mergermarket.com/pdf/Press_Release_for_Legal_Advisers_Year_End_2011.pdf;
Bloomberg 2012 1st Half Global Legal Advisor League Tables, BLOOMBERG.COM (June 30,
2012), http://about.bloomberg.com/pdf/gla.pdf.
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cording to scholars of the lawyering process like Karl Okamoto and
Richard Painter, these lawyers are vouching for their clients’ standing by
leasing to them their firm’s reputation.117
Another potential badge of insider status relates to the funds’ legal
structure and financial terms.  There is no tax or other regulatory reason
that a fund could not be formed as an LLC, for example, yet there is a
lingering preference among managers for limited partnerships.118  One
possible explanation for this choice is that it creates an imprimatur denot-
ing insider status.  A clever lawyer or manager who is new to the industry
might plausibly structure the fund as an LLC, but insiders realize that such
a choice is outside the norm.  The same is true of the industry’s traditional
“two-and-twenty” fee structure.  Another structure is certainly possible,
but it simply isn’t done—at least not by those in the know.119
Taking this idea to its logical conclusion, then, there is reason to be-
lieve that investors and managers benefit from contracting in part because
their acquisition of the “right” set of contracts serves as evidence that they
are members of the insider club.  They contract even if they believe the
words themselves will never be enforced, because doing so vouches for
their sophistication and marks them as professionals.  Or, considered in
the alternative, arriving at a potential investor’s office with the wrong set
of contracts would instantly mark the manager as a newcomer or outsider
who might not be trusted with such large amounts of capital.  Indeed, the
more standardized the contracts become, the greater their impact as ab-
stract symbols of insider status,120 so long as the standardized terms re-
main relatively opaque to the outside world.
Nor are a contract’s signaling benefits of value only vis-à-vis the
drafter’s counterparty.  Rather, a contract between a fund and its investors
can be utilized by the fund to enhance its search for quality investments.
Prominent examples of contracts as totems that augment bargaining
power include a firm commitment letter from a Wall Street bank that de-
notes the ability of its holder to quickly execute a deal, as well as a once-
feared “highly confident letter” from investment banker Michael Milken
117. See Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15, 22-
26 (1995) (arguing that one of the distinguishing characteristics of elite law firms is their
ability to serve as “reputational intermediaries” for their clients); Richard W. Painter, To-
ward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services:  In Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules,
63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221, 267-74 (1995) (advocating a regime under which lawyers reduce
client transaction and regulatory costs by certifying their good conduct).
118. See PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 21, at 6.
119. See Id.
120. See Suchman, supra note 4, at 111 (advocating that scholars approach the notion of
contract as a “sacred symbol”). One might even posit that it would be unnecessary for invest-
ment contracts to retain their present form in order to have this effect.  Were the fourteen or
so top law firms to meet and decide otherwise, for example, contracts could theoretically be
replaced with a special ID card, a secret password, or even a midnight ceremony under the
moon.  Each, if made sufficiently difficult to discover, would serve the goal of separating the
insiders from the outsiders and so serve as an effective counter to the lemon effect.
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that signified its holder’s ability to launch a hostile takeover.121  In a like
manner, a document containing a promise from the mighty CalPERS to
contribute to a fund can serve as a powerful selling point for a fund at-
tempting to entice a promising dotcom to select it from among its potential
suitors.122  Such a commitment demonstrates not only that the fund is seri-
ous and ready to deal, but that its sophistication and market savvy have
already been vouched for by the experts.  For a relational market partici-
pant interested in signaling its insider prestige, a documentary manifesta-
tion of that status may hold real appeal whether or not it also creates
enforceable legal rights.
Symbol of the Covenant.  Closely related to the ability of a written
contract to serve as an imprimatur of its holders’ status is its ability to act
as a verification of the existence of their relationship.  Like a wedding ring,
deal toy, or t-shirt emblazoned with an employer’s logo, a written contract
can serve as a reminder that the parties are not mere strangers in the eco-
nomic crowd but partners in some long-term endeavor.  In the manner
that many Christians view the act of communion as God’s covenant made
flesh, a written contract serves as a tangible representation of an abstract
relationship.
Serving in this symbolic capacity, a contract may have three construc-
tive aspects.  First, it is a confirmation of social norms.  Many contracting
parties fulfill their promises not because of the existence of consideration
or the application of principles of promissory estoppel, but because they
believe it is their duty to honor their promises.123  A tangible reminder of
that promise can therefore serve a helpful normative function in addition
to its legal role.  Indeed, there is ample evidence from the field of psychol-
ogy suggesting that people are more likely to behave with integrity if they
have recently been primed to think about the importance of honesty.124
Second, even if sophisticated parties to a contract themselves under-
stand that they are unlikely to resort to legal action in the event of a
breach, the contract as such may retain much of its deterrent effect.  If the
language of the contract is clear, on point, and in the injured party’s favor,
actual resort to the legal system may prove unnecessary.  Even a hollow
threat, if undetected by the other party, retains its power to intimidate.  In
this respect, the mere existence of a contract can serve as an alternative to
121. See Arnoud W. A. Boot, Stuart I. Greenbaum, & Anjan V. Thakor, Reputation
and Discretion in Financial Contracting, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1165, 1176 (1993).
122. See, e.g., Nicole Perlroth, Venture Capital Firms, Once Discreet, Learn the Promo-
tional Game, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2012, at B1 (“The best entrepreneurs are courted by the
venture capitalists, not the other way around.”).
123. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is For Suckers, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 1003, 1015-16 (2010) (“Psychology researchers have found that ordinary citizens believe
that they are legally and morally bound by the language of a contract they have signed even if
parts of the contract are in fact unenforceable.”) (citations omitted).
124. See, e.g., Clive Thompson, The Eyes of Honesty, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 10, 2006,
at 48.
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traditional dispute resolution.125  Evidence of this phenomenon can be
found in the frequency with which employers demand that their employ-
ees sign contracts that are unlikely to be enforced or even enforceable.126
Family law is similarly replete with agreements that are honored by the
parties without regard to their enforceability as contracts.127  Integrity can
often substitute for legal sanction, and any reminder that encourages trust-
worthy dealing holds obvious value.
Third, as Lon Fuller has observed, contractual formalities serve a cau-
tionary function.128  Being presented with a formal, written agreement
may bring the significance of the parties’ impending responsibilities to
their attention in a meaningful fashion.  As a result, the mere existence of
the contract may act as a check against “inconsiderate action.”129
For relational market participants, then, merely having a contract may
be as or more valuable than enforcing a contract.  As an imprimatur of
one’s status, a manifestation of a commitment to work cooperatively, and
a warning against inconsiderate action, a written contract can serve impor-
tant symbolic functions that exist above and apart from its value as a store
of legally enforceable promises.
B. Ceremonial Value
A second way in which contracts provide value, apart from their role as
insurers of reasonable expectations, is as a process.  Contracts, after all, do
not pop in and out of existence wholly formed like some misbehaving sub-
atomic particle, but must be carefully structured, negotiated and drafted in
a time-consuming and generally face-to-face manner.130  For relational
market participants, the opportunity to engage with one’s business part-
ners in the activity of contracting may hold appeal as a method for improv-
ing the end result, as a means for strengthening the bonds that hold the
125. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Role of Law in Settlement, in THE HANDBOOK OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 254, 254-55 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone, eds., 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=601505.
126. See Deborah A. Schmedemann & Judi Mclean Parks, Contract Formation and Em-
ployee Handbooks: Legal, Psychological and Empirical Analyses, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
647, 665 (1994) (“Rousseau’s study of M.B.A. graduates about to begin their first jobs docu-
ments psychological contracts. Even at this early stage in the relationship, the new employees
spoke of reciprocal obligations between the parties. Employees saw a quid pro quo between
their obligation to be loyal and stay for a minimum period of time and the employer’s obliga-
tion to provide job security; where the employee had no such obligation, neither did the
employer.”).
127. See, e.g., MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT:  BEYOND THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 1 (2000) (“[T]oday we find families whose covenants
derive most of their power from the family members’ mutual commitment to one another
and to the preservation and protection of the family itself.”).
128. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800 (1941).
129. Id.
130. See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF BUS. LAW, COMM. ON NEGOTIATED
TRANSACTIONS, THE M&A PROCESS (2005) [hereafter, M&A PROCESS].
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parties together, and as a ritual rite of passage signifying for the parties the
birth of their new economic reality.
Bounded Rationality. It is of course axiomatic that human beings lack
the mental capacity to foresee, let alone plan for, all possible future con-
tingencies.  As a result of what economists refer to as our “bounded ra-
tionality,” no contract can possibly be complete, no matter how clever its
drafters.131
Fortunately, the law and legal practice have developed various correc-
tives intended to minimize the problem of imperfect contracts.  So-called
implied or constructive terms, for example, are provided by contract law in
order to help flesh out provisions that were omitted or dealt with in overly
cursory fashion.132  The use by contract drafters of imprecise standards of
conduct, including “best efforts” and “reasonable notice,” similarly aim to
prevent parties from taking advantage of vague or incomplete terms.133
Indeed, Ronald Gilson has argued that the chief function of business law-
yers is to devise legal structures that minimize the mistakes and inefficien-
cies inherent in transacting.134  Despite these palliatives, however, our
courts are replete with examples of contracts that failed the test of perfec-
tion and for which no antidote was available.
This inability of contracting parties to address all future contingencies
suggests at least a partial explanation for why a party might value the pro-
cess of contracting even if she does not value the resulting contract.  The
very process of contracting forces the parties to reflect on a much wider
range of possible contingencies than they may have considered without the
requirement of putting it all down on paper in concrete and detailed fash-
ion.  The devil, as we have heard, resides in the details.  The contracting
process is therefore valuable in and of itself for the obvious reason that the
group effort and mental discipline that it requires partially offset the in-
herent limitations of the human mind.
Considered as a process rather than a creation, contracts thus provide a
foundation of mutual understanding and an opportunity for discussion,
even if the end result is never adhered to or even executed.  Family law
scholars, for example, have long understood the value of contracting as an
opportunity for counseling and planning rather than merely as a means for
producing legal rights that are unlikely ever to be enforced.135  In this re-
131. See generally Bryan D. Jones, Bounded Rationality, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 297
(1999).
132. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 7.16.
133. See Id. § 3.28. See also JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER:  STRATEGIES
AND TECHNIQUES FOR NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS § 8.2.1.
134. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers:  Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1984) (“I suggest that the tie between legal skills and transac-
tion value is the business lawyer’s ability to create a transactional structure which reduces
transaction costs and therefore results in more accurate asset pricing.”).
135. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84
VA. L. REV. 1225, 1229 (1998).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\2-1\MPE102.txt unknown Seq: 36  7-DEC-12 13:24
84 Michigan Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law [Vol. 2:49
spect, it is as an exercise in legal imagination, rather than as the basis for
changed legal rights, that a contract has value.136
Bonding.  Closely related to the planning and educational functions of
contracting is the notion that the process involved in creating a contract
provides an opportunity to build and strengthen personal relationships
among the parties.
The process of negotiating a contract, with its necessary compromises
and efforts to understand the other’s position, can generate empathy and
introduce the parties to their future partners’ temperaments, values and
styles of doing business.137  Embedded in the planning for future contin-
gencies are lessons as to the social expectations of the parties.  The closing
itself serves as an attestation of the ability of the parties to work together
under difficult circumstances and to accomplish a hard-to-reach goal.  Like
sharing a summer at sleep-away camp, the act of staying up late, night
after night, to finish a difficult project can generate lasting bonds and feel-
ings of shared achievement.  Before even commencing the relationship,
the parties have already attained a significant—and mutual—victory.
The mere process of contracting, then, can add value by strengthening
bonds and decreasing the likelihood of misunderstandings.  According to
Lisa Bernstein, this kind of bonding often predominates within “geograph-
ically concentrated, homogenous groups who deal with each other in re-
peated transactions over the long run.”138  Even absent such idealized
circumstances, important bonding can take place between parties to a par-
ticular deal and encourage them to act fairly and reasonably in all of their
dealings.139
For Bernstein, the uniqueness of the diamond industry of the 1990s lies
in the fact that its participants had been successful in lowering the costs of
reputational bonds to the degree that it became more efficient to enforce
rights outside of the legal system than within it.140  She is thus making a
Coasian argument about the nature of legal rules versus reputation—in-
dustry segments will tend to rely on whichever is the more efficient at
136. For an explanation of the importance of “legal imagination,” see Todd D. Rakoff
& Martha Minow, A Case for Another Case Method, 60 VAND. L. REV. 597, 602 (2007) (argu-
ing for the importance of “the ability to generate the multiple characterizations, multiple
versions, multiple pathways, and multiple solutions, to which [lawyers] could apply their very
well honed analytic skills.”).
137. See POSNER, supra note 100, at 13 (“Failure to conform to relevant social norms
raises suspicions about [an employee’s] character and reliability in relationships of trust, even
when there is no direct relationship between the deviant behavior and the requirements of
the job.”); Suchman, supra note 4, at 111 (“[C]ontract rituals provide symbolic reassurance
that the parties are entering into a predictable, controllable, and mutual relationship within a
social order composed of voluntary arm’s length exchanges between equally endowed
strangers.”).
138. Bernstein, supra note 83, at 140.
139. See id. at 140-43.
140. Id. at 138.
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reducing transaction costs.141  What this means is that anything that helps
build confidence and empathy among future business partners, including
various social gatherings and other rituals, may also serve to generate
bonds and minimize disputes.142  Contracting as bonding mechanism
therefore has real and measurable value.
Ritual Rite of Passage.  Over time and across cultures, societies have
evolved various rituals and rites of passage to mark important transitions.
These include anything from weddings, graduations and funerals, to vari-
ous coming-of-age ceremonies.  Anthropologists identify such rites as
composing certain common elements and symbolic gestures—such as a
kiss, the handing over of a diploma, or the closing of a casket—that signify
in a visible and tangible manner a moment of transition from one state or
status to another.143  Although such rituals may focus on only one or two
primary participants, they generally involve large groups of witnesses and
other contributors.  Frequently, they involve some sort of appeal to the
supernatural.144
According to the structural-functional school of anthropology, the
point of these rituals is to reinforce social norms and class distinctions.145
By marking clear boundaries between one rank or status and another, ritu-
als create walls of differentiation. But ritual is also transformative, an indi-
cation of social change. All the way up to the time that one loudly
pronounces “I do,” one remains a bachelor with no unbreakable social
obligations outside of one’s existing family.  Complete the rite and say the
magic words, however, and everything is different—the one-time bachelor
becomes a husband or wife and a member of a whole new family, a rela-
tionship that can be severed only through formal governmental interven-
tion.  The ritual of the wedding marks a clear division between two very
different social categories and so highlights their distinctive qualities.  To
use the words of Victor Turner, anthropology’s leading expert on ritual,
141. See generally R. J. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
142. See Davidoff, supra note 9, at 519 (“The acquisition contract and its negotiation
also served as a bonding mechanism, enhancing these norms and constraints. The negotiation
process not only established the legal parameters of the agreement but, in the discourse of
the parties, also established a relationship to sustain the transaction.”).
143. ARNOLD VAN GENNEP, THE RITES OF PASSAGE 2-3 (Monika B. Vizedom &
Gabrielle L. Caffee, trans. 1960) (originally published in French in 1908) (“For every one of
these events there are ceremonies whose essential purpose is to enable the individual to pass
from one defined position to another . . . . Thus we encounter a wide degree of general
similarity among ceremonies of birth, childhood, social puberty, betrothal, marriage, preg-
nancy, fatherhood, initiation into religious societies and funerals.”).
144. See, e.g., BOBBY C. ALEXANDER, VICTOR TURNER REVISITED:  RITUAL AS SOCIAL
CHANGE 20 (1991). See also, e.g., id. at 152 (“Ritual liminality breaks human limits, opening
up the possibility of full humanity . . . a model for human transformation at the highest, or
spiritual, level.”).
145. Id. at 3.
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the performance of certain rites “creates, or re-creates, the categories
through which men perceive reality.”146
Given this definition, it is hard not to view the process of negotiating a
complex financial agreement as a form of ritual intended to highlight the
parties’ new status as co-adventurers.147  The ritual of negotiations follow
a more or less prescribed pattern and certain rites are observed, such as
the signing and delivery of the documents.  We even have a name for the
actual moment of transition—the Closing.  And though there is rarely an
appeal to the supernatural, there is a direct and formal appeal to the law
as a higher power with the ability to enforce the parties’ new reality.  In-
deed, like the shamans of tribal societies, attorneys frequently offer their
formal opinions that their deity (in this case, the blindfolded lady justice)
will respect and honor the terms of the transition.148
According to turn-of-the-century French anthropologist Arnold van
Gennep, a ritual rite of passage like a marriage has three distinct aspects:
rites of separation, rites of transition, and rites of incorporation.149  Under
this scheme, the engagement preceding the actual wedding focuses the
participants’ attention on their upcoming departure from a prior reality
and its associated set of norms, while the transition planning and the wed-
ding ceremony itself highlight their union and the creation of a new
relationship.
Here again we can see in the act of signing an analogy to the engage-
ment, wherein a departure or transition is set in motion but not yet com-
pleted. Next, during the interim period between signing and closing a
contract, we can witness a transition wherein obligations to the other are
heightened but not yet completely certain.  During this phase, the parties
may be obligated to share information and use their best efforts to move
the transaction forward, for example, but the deal is not yet complete.150
Likewise, upon closing, we have a clear-cut moment at which a new rela-
tionship, and oftentimes a whole new entity, is created.
Viewing contracting as a form of ritual that formally marks the crea-
tion of a new relationship highlights another important reason why parties
would want to engage in the process of contracting: to highlight their new
social status as business partners.  When forming a venture capital fund or
investing in a hedge fund, for example, the parties are exposing themselves
to significant counterparty compliance risk.  As a result of bounded ration-
ality, they must trust, to a significant degree, in the power of norms, stan-
146. V. W. TURNER, THE DRUMS OF AFFLICTION:  A STUDY OF RELIGIOUS PROCESSES
AMONG THE NDEMBU OF ZAMBIA 7 (1968).
147. See D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1, 39 (2009)  (highlighting the “ceremonial function” of contract).
148. See II COMM. ON NEGOTIATED TRANSACTIONS, SECTION OF BUS. LAW, A.B.A.,
MODEL ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT WITH COMMENTARY: EXHIBITS, ANCILLARY DOCU-
MENTS AND APPENDICES 67-68 (2001).
149. GENNEP, supra note 143, at 10-11.
150. M&A PROCESS, supra note 130, at 251-67.
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dards of conduct, and the goodwill of their partners.  Thus, anything that
can be done to reinforce and underscore the parties’ cooperative union
must hold significant value.  From the moment of closing onward, there
must occur a momentous shift in behavior and expectations.  A formal
contracting ritual helps cement this transformation in the minds of the
parties.
Ultimately, the ritual of contracting provides social and psychological
benefits that endure completely distinct from whether the contract in
question is ever enforced (or even enforceable).151  By taking the parties
through a series of somewhat tedious and often costly transitions, con-
tracting as an event or ceremony helps focus their attention on the rela-
tionship that lies ahead.  Trust, cooperation and goodwill, when genuinely
felt, are major deterrents to a contract breach.  All are also heightened by
a properly enacted ritual of incorporation.
IV. THE DUAL NATURE OF CONTRACT LAW
We have now seen, in Part III, that there exist symbolic and ceremonial
reasons for a party to desire to negotiate and enter into a contract, even if
she does not anticipate ever enforcing it.  The act of negotiating terms
helps parties coordinate their expectations, build trust and familiarity, and
think through the details of their exchange.  The contract itself, even if
unlikely to be enforced, provides a tangible reminder of the parties’ bond
and vouchsafes their status.  And above all, the process of generating and
executing a contract serves a ritual purpose that marks the end of one
relationship and the beginning of another.
All of this is interesting in a descriptive sense, but also has deeper nor-
mative implications.  Dominant neo-classical contract theory is structured
around the goal of enforcing the parties’ reasonable expectations, or as
Gordon Smith and Brayden King describe it, “mitigating ex post opportu-
nism.”152  However, in the broadest sense, such theorizing appears not to
take into account situations like that described above, where the parties do
not appear to place significant value on the enforceability of their rights.
In Part IV.A, I therefore revisit the scholarship of Ian Macneil and
attempt to draw previously overlooked lessons from his models.  In Part
IV.B, I examine recent scholarship in behavioral economics that parallels
the results of Macneil’s investigations and supports the ultimate conclu-
sion of this Article—that we live not in a world containing a single, unified
contract regime but in a world of multiple regimes that should be recog-
nized and dealt with as such.  Finally, in Part IV.C, I begin to explore the
implications of this finding with respect to existing contract theory and
doctrine.  In particular, I conclude that the symbolic and ceremonial as-
151. See Suchman, supra note 4, at 111 (“Even if transacting parties know relatively
little about specific legal doctrines and have no intention of seeking court enforcement, the
ceremony of drafting and signing a contract may reenact and reinforce central elements of
faith, both about the transaction itself and about the larger social order.”).
152. Smith, supra note 147, at 1.
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pects of contract law help both relational and discrete contractors to in-
voke the power of social norms to mitigate and resolve their disputes.
A. Macneil Revisited
Lurking behind the results of our investigation into the symbolic and
ceremonial aspects of contracting is the observation that such benefits do
not accrue equally to all contracts or all contractors.  In a discrete ex-
change for example, especially where the negotiation and structuring of
the deal are completed relatively quickly and easily, as is the case in most
commercial exchanges, there may be little value to ceremony.  And when
the lemon effect is absent or the parties’ relationship is comparatively
short-lived, symbolism and signaling recede in importance.  Indeed, this is
exactly the beauty and power of neoclassical contract law; it allows anony-
mous individuals to engage in exchange without the need to enter into the
costly social dance that is typically required to generate relational
affiliations.
What we find, then, is that the lesser the degree of relationality inher-
ent in the parties’ dealings, the lesser the value of contract law’s symbolic
and ceremonial functions.  And the corollary also appears to be true.
When the exchange is highly relational, there is often little need for the
parties to resort to litigation to resolve their disputes.  Either the disputes
can be resolved through extra-legal means, such as those described by
Bernstein and Ellickson, or the value of the ongoing relationship is such
that the parties are likely to forgive most breaches.  As a result, for rela-
tional contractors, the insurance function of contracting retreats to the
background and imagery and ritual take center stage.
But what meaning does this observation hold for contract law theory
and doctrine?  For that, we must return to the work of Ian Macneil and his
fellow travelers.  Surprisingly, despite the widespread acceptance of Mac-
neil’s work, it has generated few novel theoretical insights.153  The legal
academy seems to agree generally that some contracts are more discrete
and others more relational, and also that context matters when seeking to
understand contractual dealings.  However, these ideas appear to have
been met with something of a shrug from theorists.  Macneil’s thinking
doesn’t challenge neoclassical contract theory so much as add to its de-
scriptive power.  Here, in the ceremonial and symbolic role of contracts,
we may be able to shed new light on his work.
One argument that Macneil makes repeatedly throughout his papers is
that all contracts are relational contracts.  Were it otherwise, with some
discrete exchanges existing truly apart from any prior or subsequent obli-
gations, then theft would predominate as being more efficient than negoti-
153. Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 737
(2000) (noting that “while Macneil’s work is widely cited, the level of engagement with its
details has not been commensurate with its contribution . . . .”); But see generally Relational
Contract Theory:  Unanswered Questions, A Symposium in Honor of Ian R. Macneil, 94 NW.
U. L. REV. 775 (2000).
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ation or compromise.154  Macneil makes this point in order to highlight
the relational nature of much commerce while at the same time holding
strong to his ideal of a universal theory that encompasses all legal
agreements.155
If one is willing to jettison the goal of a single, universal theory, how-
ever, one can draw a very different insight from Macneil’s conclusions.
Indeed, there appears to exist a gap in our understanding of legal and non-
legal bargaining.  Realist scholars like Bernstein and Ellickson chose as
their subject matter economic sectors wherein the parties elected to opt
out of the legal system altogether and instead resort to their own private
mechanisms of enforcement.  For Macneil, meanwhile, his subject matter
was contracts that overlap with relationships.  None of the three, however,
took Macneil’s continuum to its logical conclusion and the point that con-
nects their work.  Once one proceeds far enough toward the relational end
of the spectrum, one appears to depart from the neoclassical world of con-
tract law and enter instead into the non-legal world of Bernstein and El-
lickson.  Macneil was wrong, in other words, when he declared that the
ends of his spectrum, “like the ends of rainbows,” don’t exist.156  The rela-
tional end does exist as a world where the ceremonial and symbolic func-
tions of contract serve to establish and reinforce non-legal norms while
traditional notions of contract recede into irrelevance.
Viewed in this light, it becomes apparent that contract law can and
should serve multiple functions with different goals predominating at dif-
ferent ends of Macneil’s spectrum.  On the non-relational end, where par-
ties are at least initially anonymous and transactions comparatively
discrete, the traditional role of contract law as guarantor of expectations
remains paramount.  Contract law enables our modern exchange-based
economy by reducing the risks associated with informational costs.  By
contrast, on the relational end of the spectrum, enforcement recedes in
importance as private norms and the discipline of reputational markets
154. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations:  Its
Shortfalls and the Need for a “Rich Classificatory Apparatus”, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1018, 1040
(1981) (“All transactions deserving economic analysis, even the most discrete, take place in
the context of some social setting which creates relations between the parties.  Not even the
theoretically discrete transaction of neoclassical analysis can avoid an assumption of some
relations preventing the parties from stealing instead of exchanging as well as some relations
making promissory words binding.”).
155. Macneil, supra note 15, at 344 (noting that “it is important to stress the highly
relational character of all contracts in real life.”).  Macneil makes this point both in order to
argue against the dominance of neoclassical theories of contract and to suggest that it is
possible to explain all contractual behavior through the lens of a single, universalist theory of
relational contracts.  Thus, it is in his interest not only to describe discrete transactions as rare
or primitive (“Hobbesian”), but also to stress the universally relational nature of both dis-
crete and non-discrete contracts. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract:  What We Do
and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 483, 485-87 (1985).
156. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory, supra note 12, at 896.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\2-1\MPE102.txt unknown Seq: 42  7-DEC-12 13:24
90 Michigan Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law [Vol. 2:49
take the fore.157  As a result, the symbolic and ceremonial value associated
with the process of contracting becomes more salient.
This insight suggests that scholars and policymakers should unshackle
themselves from the desire to present a single, unified contract theory.
Instead, we can better serve market participants by viewing contract law
the way that Macneil views contracts—as a spectrum addressing the needs
of discrete, anonymous exchanges at one end and of socially intertwined
affiliations at the other.  Contract law, in other words, should best be un-
derstood as having a dual nature.  And turning to the complementary field
of behavioral economics, this is exactly what we encounter.
B. Social Markets v. Monetary Markets
In 2004, behavioral economists James Heyman and Dan Ariely pub-
lished a paper arguing that there exist two types of markets—social and
monetary.158  Of course, generations of legal realists have understood that
social norms can reinforce or even substitute for the power of legal sanc-
tion.  Even law and economics scholars have largely come around to the
view that social context contributes significantly to commercial behav-
ior.159  But Heyman and Ariely were making a more subtle point.
To make their case, Heyman and Ariely conducted a series of experi-
ments that tested the subjects’ willingness to engage in work based on the
promise of varying degrees and types of compensation.  In the first, they
asked participants to predict whether their peers would assist in lifting a
sofa into the back of a moving van (to first test the subjects’ intuitions
regarding their own behavior).  In the second, they asked participants to
move a series of computer-generated images across a screen for a three-
minute period.  In the third, they asked participants to spend as much time
as they deemed appropriate solving twelve math puzzles, the last of which
had no possible answer.160
In each of the three experiments, the results were the same.  When
money was discussed, participants’ effort increased and decreased in lock-
157. Perhaps the best example of this idea is the general partnership.  While the subject
of a discrete body of statutory and common law, partnerships, like other business entities, are
really just semi-permanent bundles of contractual relationships.  Indeed, Macneil himself ac-
knowledged the “nexus of contracts” nature of firms. See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:  Adjust-
ment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational
Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 865 (1978) (“Were we to push far in the direction of
contractual relations, we would come to the firm itself, since a firm is, in significant ways,
nothing more than a very complex bundle of contractual relations.”) (footnote omitted).
158. James Heyman & Dan Ariely, Effort for Payment:  A Tale of Two Markets, 15
PSYCH. SCI. 787 (2004).
159. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27
J. LEGAL  STUD. 537 (1998) (noting that “scholars in many disciplines increasingly are em-
phasizing the significance of the informal glue that holds a society together.”).
160. Heyman & Ariely, supra note 158, at 788-92.
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step as did the amount of the consideration.161  Subjects appeared to
gauge their level of effort based on the stated value of the promised re-
ward.  By contrast, when no money was mentioned, subjects worked at a
consistently higher level than when they were offered any form of mone-
tary payment.162  When lifting a sofa or solving math problems became a
courtesy rather than a business  proposition, they expended maximum
effort.
Based on these experiments, and building on prior work in the field of
social psychology, Heyman and Ariely posited that human beings inhabit
two distinct but overlapping worlds—one characterized by monetary mar-
kets and one by social markets.163  The result, they observed, is that as
citizens of two worlds we must all make repeated and frequent (and gener-
ally unconscious) decisions regarding which market is dominant during
any given interaction, social or monetary.  And once the decision is made,
we behave according to the dictates of social norms or marketplace com-
petition, as the case may be.
Considering these experiments in the light of Macneil’s work on rela-
tional contracts, a clear analogy presents itself.  We can liken Heyman and
Ariely’s social markets to Macneil’s relational contracts, and their mone-
tary markets to his understanding of discrete exchanges.  Heyman and
Ariely appear to be observing, through the means of controlled experi-
mentation, the same phenomenon as did Macneil.  Our world of com-
merce is not unified and consistent, but divided and at tension with itself.
C. Implications for Theory and Doctrine
For more than a generation, physicists have been preoccupied with the
goal of uncovering a “theory of everything.”  Their aim has been to recon-
cile quantum mechanics, which explains the behavior of very small things
like atoms and their component parts, with Einstein’s and Newton’s theo-
ries regarding gravity, which explain the behavior of very large things like
planets and stars.164  Their assumption has been that it is implausible to
imagine that the physical world operates according to two sets of rules.
Rather, all things, large and small, must obey the same basic principles.
161. This was true whether money was mentioned as the form of payment itself or as
the value of some non-monetary form of payment, as in “I’ll give you a five-dollar candy
bar.” Id.
162. Id. at 792.
163. See Alan Page Fiske, The Four Elementary Forms of Sociality:  Framework for a
Unified Theory of Social Relations, 99 PSYCHOL. REV. 689, 690 (1992) (arguing that all social
interactions can be divided into one or more of four categories:  communal sharing, authority
ranking, equality matching, and market pricing). See also Margaret S. Clark & Judson Mills,
Interpersonal Attraction in Exchange and Communal Relationships, 37 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 12-24 (1979); Margaret S. Clark, Record Keeping in Two Types of Relation-
ships, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 549-57 (1984).
164. See generally LEE SMOLIN, THE TROUBLE WITH PHYSICS:  THE RISE OF STRING
THEORY, THE FALL OF A SCIENCE, AND WHAT COMES NEXT (2006) (arguing that theoretical
physicists have become overly enamored of elegance and simplicity).
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Except that, despite the efforts of countless scientists and mathematicians,
no one has yet uncovered any of those principles.165
Universalists like Macneil (and for that matter, the drafters of the Re-
statement and the Uniform Commercial Code) have fallen into the same
trap.  Generally speaking, they assume that “contracts” represents a sin-
gle, coherent doctrine capable of explaining and policing all commercial
behavior.166  And yet where is the offer and acceptance in a complex,
months-long merger negotiation?  And can the same theory of considera-
tion provide an adequate explanation for the enforceability of marriage
proposals and shrink-wrapped computer licenses?  Surely, the goals of
contract law with respect to online user agreements need not be identical
to those applied to a social institution like marriage.
The work of behavioral economists in distinguishing social and mone-
tary markets, the continuum of relationality described by Macneil, and the
value that private investment fund managers and investors appear to place
on the symbolic and ceremonial aspects of contracting—all of these point
away from a single, universal theory of everything for contract law.  In-
stead, they suggest that contract law contains within itself a duality of both
purpose and function.
Macneil’s continuum, once separated from its universalist tendencies,
establishes a theoretical foundation for such a division of doctrine.  When
exchanges are discrete and involve comparatively anonymous participants,
contract doctrine reduces transaction costs by guaranteeing that the par-
ties’ reasonable expectations will be met.  By contrast, when transactions
are ongoing, frequent, and involve close personal contact—when they are
“relational” or “social”—the purpose and function of contract law shift.
The benefits to be derived from ceremony and symbolism rise to para-
mount importance.  Indeed, the UCC already takes tentative steps in the
direction of duality when it distinguishes between merchant and non-
merchant transactions.167
This recognition of contract law’s dual nature yields two primary impli-
cations, the second being significantly more subtle and profound than the
first.  In the first place, it suggests that contract doctrine should be tailored
to respond to the particular function or functions that are most relevant to
the particular context of any given transaction.  When an exchange is dis-
crete and the parties are economic strangers, the law should seek to maxi-
mize its role as marketplace policeman, for example by emphasizing the
use of bright-line rules.  By contrast, when the context is more relational
165. Although string theory has been recommended as a possible solution with the po-
tential to explain the behavior of both large and small objects, it has been criticized for both
failing to predict new phenomena and being unverifiable in that it cannot be disproved
through scientific inquiry. See generally id.
166.   See Macneil, supra note 15, at 344.
167. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314 (2004) (stipulating that “a war-
ranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is
a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.”) (emphasis added).
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or social in nature, doctrine should be evolved to serve the parties’ sym-
bolic and ceremonial interests.168  The law’s role, in other words, should
adjust as the parties’ needs change.
But merely seeking to marry doctrine to the context of a deal is far too
unambitious a goal for such a potent legal regime as contracts.  If Heyman
and Ariely are correct, the law can be used not only to respond to and
reflect the parties’ pre-existing interests and goals, but to help shape and
alter those interests and goals.  Extrapolating from the current behavioral
economics research, we can infer that the degree of a transaction’s rela-
tionality is to some extent malleable.  As Heyman and Ariely put it, the
range of a person’s “prosocial” behavior can be impacted by various exter-
nal cues and stimuli.169  And here we find the second and more important
implication of a non-unitary theory of contract law.  Wherever possible,
contract doctrine can and should be designed so as to push or “nudge”
entire transactions into the world of social markets described by Heyman
and Ariely.170  In this respect, symbolism and ceremony morph to become
simultaneously both means and ends.
To date, most of the behavioral economics research into social and
monetary markets has been focused on the impact of money on the par-
ties’ behavior, with the mere mention of dollars tending to thrust the par-
ties’ relationship toward the monetary end of the spectrum.171  Consider,
for example, a well-known study of childcare centers in Israel.  Its authors,
Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, noted that parents sometimes arrived
late to pick up their children.  When the parents were informed that they
would henceforth be subjected to a monetary fine each time they arrived
late, however, the occurrence of lateness markedly increased rather than
decreased.172  Forcing the caregivers to stay late after work hours ceased
to be perceived as impolite behavior for which the perpetrators would
have to pay a social price, and became a service that they could purchase
168. See Macneil, supra note 157, at 854 (noting that relational contracts require greater
amounts of flexibility and are therefore better suited to broad standards).
169. See, e.g., Dan Ariely, Anat Bracha & Stephan Meier, Doing Good or Doing Well?
Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially, at 2-3, 17-18 (2008),
available at http://opimweb.wharton.upenn.edu/documents/seminars/Meier_Paper.pdf.  Note,
however, that existing research suggests that cues for monetary  norms are extremely power-
ful and not easily overcome by other signals or behaviors. See, e.g., Uzi Gneezy & Aldo
Rustichini, Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All, 115 Q. J. ECON. 791, 791-93 (2006); Samuel
Bowles & Sandra Polania Reyes, Economic Incentives and Social Preferences:  A Preference-
based Lucas Critique of Public Policy, CESifo Working Paper No. 2734, at 19-21 (2009),
available at http://www.cesifo-group.de/pls/guestci/download/CESifo%20Working%20Papers
%202009/CESifo%20Working%20Papers%20July%202009/cesifo1_wp2734.pdf.
170. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:  IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 14-15 (2008) (describing how legal doctrine can
be utilized to push people toward particular policy ends without unduly limiting their free-
dom to choose otherwise).
171. See, e.g., Kathleen D. Vohs, Nicole L. Mead & Miranda R. Goode, The Psychologi-
cal Consequences of Money, 314 SCIENCE 1154 (2006).
172. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5-8 (2000).
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with money.  The application of an external cue—in this case a monetary
fine for arriving late—changed the parties’ behavior from a cooperative,
nonmarket activity into a purely economic exchange.173
As a corollary to the work done on the impact of monetary cues, there
is reason to postulate that the opposite result can also be achieved.  By
controlling various external factors, including the quality and quantity of
symbolism and ceremony that accompany a transaction, both lawmakers
and market participants appear to have the power to prod a given transac-
tion toward the realm of social markets.  When the parties to a contract
consciously summon up social norms intended to accentuate the relational
aspects of the transaction, they will tend to be rewarded by more coopera-
tive and altruistic behavior on the part of their counterparties.  Imagery
and ritual can thus potentially recast a discrete or monetary transaction in
terms of social norms and thereby introduce an entire other, non-legal par-
adigm of protection for the parties.174
In this respect, symbolism and ceremony are of both direct and indirect
value.  As we have seen, relational market participants are benefitted by
both the imprimatur that a properly crafted contract can impart and the
ritual consequences that arise from the process of contracting.  In addition,
however, these cultural aspects of contract law also provide indirect value
as a means to elicit and strengthen social norms.  By highlighting the rela-
tional nature of a transaction, imagery and ritual provide external cues
that frame the parties’ interaction in terms of Heyman and Ariely’s social
markets.  They encourage the parties to imagine themselves occupying a
world governed not by legal dictates but by norms of good behavior.
Law and sociology scholar Mark Suchman (among others) argues that
legal doctrine and judicial dispute resolution are of relatively little impor-
tance when compared to informal community norms.175  Resort to litiga-
tion can be costly and risky, and tends to put an end to any prior
relationship.  Norms, by contrast, have the power to resolve the many mi-
nor disputes and misunderstandings that are inevitable in any ongoing re-
lationship.  As such, they serve as the ultimate gap-filler, addressing
matters too granular for our blunt legal system to manage.  A legal regime
that uses symbolism and ceremony to increase the prevalence and power
of such norms therefore promises to be extremely potent.
Admittedly, the audience for this type of theorizing may not be
lawmakers and judges so much as attorneys and counselors.  If parties to a
contract wish to make its signing or closing into a spectacle of pageantry,
existing doctrine will not impede them.  It is within the power and discre-
173. Id. at 13.
174. This observation is essentially a variation on Macneil’s (and others’) pronounce-
ment that, in general, contract law should and does “more or less track” the behavioral
norms of contracting parties. See Macneil, Relational Contract Theory, supra note 12, at 893.
175. Suchman, supra note 4, at 96 (“Legal doctrine and legal recourse often matter very
little . . . since most transactions are governed, in practice, by informal community norms,
enforced by informal social sanctions.”).
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tion of the attorneys advising on the transaction to create such a result.
Indeed, deal lawyers have long recognized the importance of addressing
social issues when negotiating a transaction.176
Still, while existing law accommodates the use of symbolism and cere-
mony, it neither requires nor encourages it.  Evolving a set of doctrines
that seek to enhance their impact will not only serve the direct interests of
relational contracts but also shift all contracts toward the relational or so-
cial end of the spectrum and thereby fortify the impact of social norms in
setting modes of behavior and resolving disputes informally.
Bernstein, meanwhile, warns that attempting to incorporate commu-
nity norms into judicial decision-making can disrupt the informal function-
ing of those very norms.177  But that is not my claim.  My claim is that the
law should seek to identify and promote not the norms themselves, but the
factors that make norms arise and predominate in the first place.  Private
law should seek to bolster those factors that help frame a transaction as
being more social or relational, thereby encouraging and reinforcing both
greater reliance on norms and increased usage of contract’s symbolic and
ceremonial functions.
Ultimately, the goal of contract law should be to make itself irrelevant
in all but the most discrete of private transactions.  Contract law is, after
all, only a second-best solution.  If the parties in fact cooperate and trust
one another, any compromise they achieve will be in nearly all respects
superior to the law’s formal mechanism of ex post dispute resolution.
Given the power of social norms to avoid, minimize, and ultimately re-
solve disputes via extra-legal mechanisms, we should therefore seek to
make all transactions as relational as possible.  Legal doctrines that em-
phasize ritual and imagery provide external cues that frame interactions as
occurring within the realm of social markets and so underscore and
heighten the impact of social norms.
V. CONCLUSION
Most contracts are never breached.  And most breaches, whether real
or anticipatory, are never litigated.  Rather, the vast majority of contract-
related behavior takes place within the private realm of the contracting
parties’ intramural relationship.  And yet, as this Article makes clear,
there are significant ceremonial and symbolic benefits associated with the
process of contracting that extend beyond the value of any legal rights an
enforceable agreement may generate.
The behavior of private investment funds during the panic of 2008 is a
prime example of this.  Large numbers of hedge fund managers refused to
176. M&A PROCESS, supra note 130, at 66-69; FREUND, supra note 133, § 11.2.
177. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court:  Rethinking the Code’s Search
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1768-69 (1996) (arguing that at-
tempts by judges to incorporate “immanent business norms” into their decisions, as contem-
plated by the Uniform Commercial Code, can disrupt and interfere with the vary norms the
law seeks to promote).
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return their investors’ capital, yet their investors largely acquiesced.  Simi-
larly, large numbers of investors reneged on their promise to fund future
venture capital deals, yet the fund managers again failed to press their
rights.  The parties valued their contracts enough to expend significant
time and resources negotiating them on the front end, but did not care to
resort to contract law’s ultimate sanction in order to enforce their expecta-
tions on the back end.
Generations of scholars have found it fruitful to approach the study of
contracts, first from a classical, formalist direction, then from a more con-
text-based neo-classical direction.  My tentative conclusion from the case
studies presented in this Article is that it may be time to begin approach-
ing contracts from additional directions as well.  One possibility is to con-
sider studying contracts more as process than product—more for their
ceremonial and symbolic functions than as mere abstract vessels embody-
ing a set of legal rights and obligations.  Another related possibility is to
begin to consider more assertively the context in which transactions take
place, with the goal of tailoring doctrine to the particular needs of particu-
lar deal structures.  One way to tackle this challenge would be to spend
more time comparing the use of contracts across industry segments, histor-
ical periods, and cultures.178  Other disciplines, including anthropology/so-
ciology and behavioral economics, may also provide useful fonts for
innovative thinking.
My objective in this Article is not to challenge the usefulness of ex-
isting neo-classical contract doctrine to explain and regulate discrete ex-
changes.  Rather, my goal is to counter the universalist tendency of legal
(and other) scholars to seek elegant, all-encompassing theories where
none exist.  Our understanding of both monetary and social markets
would be enhanced if we moved beyond the temptation to privilege grace-
ful theories over messy contextual realities.  By emphasizing where appro-
priate the symbolic and ceremonial aspects of a transaction, the law can
both serve the direct interests of relational contractors and enhance the
external cues that elicit and incorporate potent social norms.  Contract law
does not lend itself to a theory of everything.
178. See Suchman, supra note 4, at 125.
